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IN the course of last year we twice took occasion to consider our present duties and position as Catholics in England; and gave utterance to some thoughts, which we believe had occurred to many besides ourselves, on questions which nobody can with propriety overlook, and which nobody can hope to set at rest. An obstacle in the way of all who wish for agreement on the subject is, that whilst every judgment which we form on our present condition is determined in great measure by the views we entertain relative to past history, we are no more agreed about the past than about the present. Where our knowledge of events is not obscured by time, it is often quite as much distorted by partiality. We should peradventure be obliged to go back to the time of the schism and the spoliation of the Church, to get clear of the debatable land, and obtain firm footing on ground that affords no matter for Catholics to contest about. Those who look only to the external apparent effect, may consider that such practical discord is a strange unkindly fruit of the unity of faith, and may argue that an excessive license *in dubiis* shows a deficiency either of faith or unity *in necessariis*. But our differences, however deplorable in their consequences, may readily be explained and excused, if we consider the causes which produce them. While the Protestant is obliged to cling to a mendacious tradition on matters of fact to make up for the extreme divergence of opinions on matters of faith,—because such secondary things, which are of no great consequence to us, are to him of more vital concern than questions of doctrine,—the Catholic is not interested in maintaining a particular view of the details of history or of natural science. His religion is no more affected by the detection of a scandal

in the Church than by the discovery of a fossil man, or of an African tribe whose heads do grow beneath their shoulders. It is not for him that vindications of Catholic times and personages are written. He has no difficulty in admitting the virtues of his adversaries,—the humility of Calvin, the temperance of Luther,—when they are proved (*quamquam id non sit meritorium vitæ æternæ*); on the contrary, the sin of heresy is so enormous, that a Catholic may be easily indulgent on smaller things. When a man has been guilty of treason and murder, it seems both superfluous and spiteful to reproach him with breaking the Sabbath, or cheating his washerwoman. Whilst, therefore, we are content to rely on the laws of historical evidence applied with the utmost rigour, the Protestant must make them bend to the exigencies of his case. His facts must be as false as his theory; he is obliged to be consistent in his perversion of truth.

No true Protestant can surrender the historical assumption on which the Reformation rests,—the corruption of the Church in doctrine and discipline during the middle ages. If the Popes were justified in condemning heretics, and resisting the temporal power, the Reformation has nothing to stand upon. This is the foundation of all specifically Protestant views of history, and must be held to as firmly as the history of the Apostles. As a real Protestant, he can no more give up one than, as a Christian, the other; so long as his Christianity believes the history of St. Peter, his Protestantism cannot do justice to that of St. Peter's successors.

The really valid excuse for the existing variety of views on our past,—from which a similar variety of views on our present must needs follow,—is, that our history is very imperfectly known. If it were more thoroughly cleared up,—the earlier period from the mists of ignorance, the later from the mists of prejudice,—it would then be possible to appeal with effect to the experience of English Catholics as a lesson for their present guidance. The man would render us an incalculable service who displayed the energy, the zeal, and, above all, the courage to bring to light the whole truth concerning both the noble and consoling history of the persecutions, and the less edifying story of our gradual emancipation. It is to illustrate the former that our labours have, by a sort of instinct, been chiefly directed. It would be less easy indeed, but more instructive, to show clearly how, whilst the penal laws were being slowly relaxed, the Catholics dwindled to an insignificant body in the state, weak in numbers, in knowledge, and in zeal; and how, after Milner had seen the dawn of a brighter day, we obtained political consequence through

Ireland, and intellectual importance from another source. This would help us to judge the last scene of all—to understand what advantages have been derived from emancipation, especially from the admission of English Catholics into Parliament, and how we have turned to account in literature and education the vast accession of strength which the Oxford movement sent us; how the old elements have amalgamated with the new, and what has proceeded from their harmonious action.

This last point brings us to a question which has become of serious importance, and for the discussion of which the time seems to have arrived,—the condition and prospects of our literature, and of our periodical press in England. Not that we are about to exercise our function of criticism on the writers of books, or to disturb the peaceful enjoyment of their popularity or their dusty repose; our business is with our periodicals; but we may introduce it with one or two general remarks.

If we except certain very elaborate essays in the *Atlantis*, there is hardly any thing serious or durable in the productions of the Catholic literature of the day. Entertaining books abound; we have history made edifying, science religious, and religion exceedingly attractive,—in short, plenty of most unobjectionable reading. But a popular literature cannot stand alone; it must be fed by the overflowings of more serious books. It is incapable of progress or improvement; and, if cultivated to the exclusion of more substantial things, must inevitably degenerate. By itself it is injurious: it encourages people to forget that something else is wanted, and promotes a superficial self-contented way of looking at all things, of despising difficulties, and overlooking the force of objections. It nourishes the delusion that we have only to communicate truths, not to discover them; that our knowledge needs no increase except in the number of those who participate in it. This indifference to real learning is so great, that the very meritorious project of a library of translations, which certainly did not begin with books of a very profound character, met with no support. The consequence is, that we have not half a dozen books which will bear critical examination, or which we are not ashamed of before Protestants and foreigners; and we contribute nothing to the literature of the Church. Lingard's *History of England* has been of more use to us than any thing that has since been written; it was so far superior to the books that preceded it,—to Hume, who could not be trusted, and to Henry, whom nobody could read,—that all educated men were obliged

to use it, and thus became accustomed to the Catholic statement of the subject. It is to this day a tower of strength to us. Its deficiencies are so notorious, that it is quite the fashion to complain of them; and yet nobody has shown himself able to correct them. A single serious treatise of theology or philosophy or history, if merely as a proof that we have somebody who understands such things, would be of more value than almost all the flimsy publications of Catholic booksellers for the last ten years. Now, though our writers are capable of better things, and though this mode of writing is sanctioned by great examples, and almost imposed on us by circumstances, yet it is our interest and duty to let nothing prevent us from endeavouring to supply its deficiencies.

The great object of our literary efforts ought to be to break down that Protestant tradition which pervades all the literature, serious as well as popular, and enchains all the intellect, of the country; which meets us at every turn, and often forces us into an antagonistic extreme. For, in the absence of a solid literature of our own, we are generally compelled to meet objections by simple negation and contradiction, and by arguing against each particular error on the assumption that the contrary is true. Where there is nothing to fall back upon, no basis of operations, no Catholic literature and traditions of equal weight and standing and consistency to refer to in argument, it is a natural consequence that we should blindly run into extremes, adopt any view and any argument that helps to refute the proposition we are opposing, and have recourse to hasty statements and solutions, which seem safe because they sound well to pious ears, but which really lead to greater difficulties, and expose Catholics to very unpleasant rejoinders. We have a noteworthy example of this in a neighbouring country, where a party of Catholic apologists are for ever answering the falsehoods of an infidel press with statements almost as startling and equally unscrupulous. Perhaps the worst sign of our own imperfection is the want of sensibility to the lessons this spectacle should teach us. We have a helot perpetually drunk before our eyes, and are hardly moved to a suitable disgust at the hideous sight. Unfortunately there are others upon whom it is not lost, and who know how to avail themselves of it with lamentable effect.

Nothing can be better adapted to raise the character of our literature than the Reviews; and, considering the state of things we have described, it is to them we must chiefly look for improvement: it is for them to point out deficiencies, and to indicate and promote the remedy.

Last summer the *Tablet* published a letter, in which the Catholic body was informed that our chief Review could not continue to appear in the state to which it was reduced; and that the editor proposed to resign his charge into other hands, if a successor could be found fitted for the task. This announcement scarcely excited either surprise or regret: it was no secret that the means were wanting for keeping up the character of the Review in the manner desired by its conductors and its readers, and by very many Catholics besides. Not long after, the *Weekly Register* told us that no change had taken place in the management; it is therefore certain that the recent numbers have been prepared under the same auspices which presided over the better days of the Review, when it held among Catholics and Protestants a high and honourable position. Whilst the conductors are still the same, whose competency has been so clearly proved, the public from whom they might expect support has greatly increased, and the addition to the number of writers whose contributions would be extremely valuable has been in proportion still greater. The expectations of the public and the means of satisfying them have risen, yet the Review has declined. Though there is now amongst us an amount of literary ability sufficient, if concentrated, to constitute a first-rate journal, and an educated public quite large enough to support it, yet the writers as well as the readers of the only Catholic Quarterly have fallen off to such an extent that it cannot maintain itself without showing signals of distress. How comes it that, together with such a growth of resources and of legitimate claims, there should be such a diminution of performance? The problem is the more curious, that this deplorable state of things is the consequence of no controversy, of no competition,—at least within the limits of the Catholic body. Whilst the Review has been permitted to censure and attack with impunity, nobody has attacked or desired to injure it; and, what is most remarkable, nobody has profited by its decline. This is the really significant circumstance, that there has been no compensation; it is a dead loss to the Catholics in England. That infidel publication which is the most ably conducted Quarterly in the country, after swallowing up large sums of money for many years, is still unable to subsist without considerable subsidies, and has no difficulty in obtaining them; but an appeal to the English Catholics for such assistance as was given to their Review at its commencement seems to have been unsuccessful. Is this apathy to be explained by the hypothesis that Catholics prefer the ability of Protestant organs to the orthodoxy of their own, and are content to read nothing

more edifying than the *Edinburgh* or *Westminster*? The true explanation, we rather think, will be found in the history of the Review itself.

If we compare our days with the period when it was started, more than twenty years ago, it is obvious that times are so much altered as necessarily to affect the character and aim of a publication which should attempt to be now what it was then, the organ of the English and Irish Catholics. A consciousness of this, by the way, has been shown in the circumstance, that a series of articles have appeared with the acknowledged object of modifying and correcting the views of Lingard, one of the early patrons of the Review. But, in reality, it has not adapted itself to the progress of things. Times have changed, and it has not changed with them.

It is, if we mistake not, to that very increase among Catholics, which ought to have enriched the Review, that its decline is to be ascribed. The narrow ground which it was forced to occupy at a time when our literature was in its infancy, afforded no space for an increase of range. New ideas and wants arose which had not been thought of at first, which, as it never enlarged its horizon, it never succeeded in satisfying. Instead of leading, it has fallen behind the march of Catholic thought in England, and has given little aid in keeping pace with it abroad. Not only did many eminent men continue unattached to it, and deprived of encouragement and of an opening for their studies, but it did not always succeed in competing with Protestant periodicals for the services of Catholic writers. Judged by the interests of the Review, this was a serious defect; for the Catholics generally it was a real calamity. This exclusiveness obliged other organs of the Catholic press to occupy the positions which were neglected; and forced them, where opposition was not intended and competition impossible, into a sort of involuntary antagonism. The ideas which were excluded—we will not say proscribed—by the Quarterly, whose voice was too weak to cause an echo, had to obtain a hearing in other places, where a different tone prevailed. It was of more importance to supply its deficiencies than to promote its influence; and the attempt to make up for its exclusive character almost inevitably assumed the appearance of an exclusiveness of another kind.

Thus, in restricting its own sphere, the *Dublin Review* soon looked with an increasing jealousy upon all who did not accept the same limitations; and the elements which were not yet brought into perfect harmony amongst us assumed, in the periodical press, the semblance of discord. This was the more

to be regretted, that it was not seriously the case. Differences such as subsist amongst us, founded upon questions of personal influence, and nourished by immaturity of thought and knowledge, though they may have the venom, have neither the permanence nor even the dignity of disputes on principle. But no great question of principle has in our day divided the English Catholics.

Parallel with this increasing deficiency with regard to ourselves, another soon grew up in respect of the Protestant world. The attention of the *Dublin Review* was from the first concentrated upon the Oxford movement. The party of which the *British Critic* was the mouthpiece was intellectually the most important in the Established Church, and the one with which controversy was most called for and most likely to avail. But since that day great changes have ensued. New schools have risen into importance, already strong in numbers, and far more formidable in point of talent; and all the learning of misbelieving foreigners is made to contribute to their support. The ablest English Quarterly derives its inspiration from Germany, the ablest Weekly from France; and the American Unitarians have a visible influence upon a portion of the press. With these new adversaries, armed with new and unexpected weapons, the Review has hardly attempted to wage what would certainly be an unequal war. It has not kept pace with the intellectual movement of the country. It has been hampered by its own traditions. It has neglected to draw the attention of its readers to the things which it is most important for them to know, and to inform them of the real secret of the enemy's strength. This omission has led to one most pernicious result. It has encouraged the insane delusion that scientific infidelity is not, like heresy, an antagonist that it behoves Catholics to encounter; that misbelievers and disbelievers must be allowed to fight it out between them, and the dead left to bury their dead; that no danger threatens the Church from that party, and that Catholics have no special duty towards it. People are permitted to imagine that this is no new enemy, that calls for new efforts of polemics or irenics to controvert or to reconcile, and are suffered to indulge the indolent propensity of subsisting on the capital accumulated by their fathers. Why should we be disquieted by the attacks of presumptuous infidels? Is not all this answered in our books? Is not St. Thomas good enough for them, or Bellarmine, or Bossuet, or Butler? What need they more? Did not the Crusaders, with bow and battle-axe, conquer Jerusalem? Wherefore waste gunpowder on miserable Hindoos? Thus an Irishman who has taken a bath in the dog-

days considers himself provided with cleanness to last him all the year round. With this supine self-confidence, we have neglected to make the vast advance of European learning available to us; and we consequently find ourselves opposed at a far greater disadvantage to our infidel antagonists now than to the Tractarians eighteen or twenty years ago.

The Catholic public has felt convinced that the most important topics would not be found discussed in its chief literary journal, and that hardly any topics would be found discussed in it by the most competent men. We have enlarged upon these circumstances, not by way of disparagement, but for the purpose of explaining a deficiency which nobody disputes. Before a remedy can be applied, the cause of the disease must be ascertained; on the other hand, it is a sign neither of good policy nor of self-respect to betray the wants of one's own party without showing at the same time the prospect and the means of relieving them. In this case, the object of our wishes will not be questioned, we apprehend, by any of our readers.

All Catholics would be proud of a Review worthy to uphold their cause and to command the respect and attention of Protestants. We are impatient of that reproach of inferiority which we know to be unjust, but which we must bear so long as a large proportion of the literary power which is amongst us has no opportunity of being employed. We wish the knowledge and ideas of the best men in the Catholic body to be the common property of the whole. We want an organ, which shall speak with the authority both of talent and position, to assist us in our self-improvement and in the perpetual contest with the enemies of the Church. In the knowledge and performance of our social duties it cannot assist us; but in politics and literature it is our only resource. It should keep us informed not only of the progress of Catholic learning, but of the position of the Church in other countries, in order that we might learn by the experience of others, and compare it with our own. A Review has space both to state the facts and to point the moral; and we require its protection against the ignorance, the malignity, and the mendacity of the Protestant press. The spectacle of the comparative prosperity of religion in different countries is full of political instruction as well as of religious interest. It shows the Catholics of France paying for an unsafe prosperity a price which goes far to deprive them of all influence and public esteem; in Russia it exhibits the hostility of an inflexible system baffling the apparent benevolence of the imperial family towards the Church; and in Naples it displays despotism producing

abuses in religion such as we hardly dare allude to, and such as would scarcely be believed if told even of the Muscovite clergy. Nor do democracies afford a more consoling aspect than absolute governments. In Switzerland the tyranny of a radical majority weighs heavily upon the Church; whilst in the United States, exposed to the caprice of a half-civilised population, she is beset with dangers unknown to the Old World. Again, we should observe how in Catholic countries mean governments, by the confiscation of ecclesiastical property, have strengthened religion by diminishing temptation, but have injured the state itself by a revolutionary measure; how, since the Belgian revolution, the Dutch Catholics have obtained a freedom they hardly know how to use, whilst in Belgium they are losing the advantages of their victory, and have escaped a Protestant domination only to become the victims of their liberal allies. Most satisfactory of all perhaps we should find the condition of the Church in Prussia, where, in a position nearly resembling our own, the Catholics possess far greater power; and in Austria, where, in laborious conflict with long-cherished customs and with her own traditions, she is acquiring an independence which will transform the empire. With all these things it would be well if we were more familiar, and were more able to follow and sympathise with the contests which are every where waging for the freedom and the progress of religion.

If we had been led by the contemplation of the Church in other countries, as well as other times, to draw the inferences to which it irresistibly leads; to understand that democracy is no friend to religion, and that despotism either oppresses or corrupts it; that representative institutions are the protection of the Church in Protestant states, and in Catholic states too frequently her scourge; and that she has more to fear from political than from religious systems,—we should possess some criterion of our own by which to judge political affairs, and should have obtained some basis of political principles. If this had not been unfortunately neglected, a sound tone might have been created; we might have learnt to consider more than interests, and a regard might have been kept alive for higher ideas, which is easily lost in the midst of continual strife.

Formerly the Catholics of England were accustomed and content to suffer, when their principles exposed them to terrible penalties. Their resolution was not shaken by the prospect of petty relief; only when a great change approached, and hopes of total emancipation came to be entertained, they accommodated their conduct to circumstances, and sided, con-

trary to every tradition, with the party which, for no principle, but for purposes of its own, temporarily supported their claims. Hope had more power over us than fear. Since then we have lived from hand to mouth, contemptuous of the morrow. But though the season has arrived when the system of adaptation and the alliance, which would have been ignoble but for the imperiousness of O'Connell, is no longer necessary or excusable, we have yet to learn the wisdom and confidence of a new position. Vices may take the place of virtues in critical moments. There is some general truth in Royer Collard's panegyric of a famous statesman: "He was ignorant and brutal. These two virtues were the saving of France." But the day comes when these qualities are exhibited with less propriety, and when it is a relief to submit to the habits and precepts of ordinary times. We are, politically, still in a state of transition. If we no longer borrow our doctrines from the system of a party, we are hardly yet conscious of any of our own. Our querulous murmurs, petty skirmishing, and vexatious grievance-hunting, are supported by no consistent plan, by no high purpose. We have quitted our old ranks; but have not set up a banner of our own, and incur some of the risks of those who have no colours to show. We have our hierarchy, in spite of the law of the land; we ought to acknowledge our principles, in defiance of its prejudices. English Catholics have, indeed, few opportunities of political action, and little occasion of educating themselves for it. But this is precisely the want which it befits the gravity of a Quarterly Review to supply. We believe we can discern in that instinctive jealousy with which many Catholics regard the efforts of government to promote education,—a jealousy for which we, at least, should be unwilling to admit no deeper cause than that to which it is generally referred,—some reason to hope that they will be among the first to understand and to resist the encroachments with which we are threatened in other departments of the state. We alone have something which cannot be sacrificed to its purposes, in which we cannot suffer control. We trust that the principle of resistance to the increasing power of the state over the nation, which is the secret of true liberty, will find amongst Catholics, in political as well as religious matters, its most determined adherents. But it requires more political sagacity and experience than are common in a country where such dangers are new, to detect in the measures of government all the consequences of the principle on which they are based. For the heathen and revolutionary system of compulsion for the public good, of the greatest happiness of the greatest number,

by which the whole is distinct from the several parts, and is preferred to them, and by which an abstraction reigns supreme over each individual, has already taken root amongst us. But this is a point on which we shall not learn wisdom from our Protestant contemporaries, and on which it would be well to have a teacher of our own.

Still more do we need a guide, an example, and an authority, in literature; and this would be the great purpose which a Review could accomplish. The literary inferiority of Catholics is due to the absence of the will, not of the power, to excel. Where they are inferior, it is because they do not feel the value and the dignity of the pursuit. The contempt and indifference with which knowledge is often regarded, soon engender aversion and dread. The studies which Catholics neglect, are cultivated by others; and if not made to serve the Church, are inevitably used to injure her. Our inferiority is the penalty of our indolence. At the Revolution, as at the Reformation, the literature and science of the day had completely severed themselves from religion. At both periods learning had suddenly advanced, and important discoveries had been made, in which Catholics had had no part. They were almost completely excluded from the intellectual movement of the age; and the hostility of religion and learning, which one party was interested in proclaiming, was foolishly acquiesced in by the other. In the nineteenth century, as in the sixteenth, the lost ground was recovered by the same means,—by claiming for the Church the principle of scientific investigation which seemed to threaten her, and binding to her service the force with which she was attacked. This was the great idea expressed by Copernicus in his dedication to Paul III. He well knew, he said, the contempt with which his discoveries would be received by those who play among philosophers the part of drones amongst bees; and if he considered his own comfort, he would communicate them privately, like Pythagoras, to his disciples. But he confidently commits them to the protection of the Pope himself, whose cause they cannot but serve, in spite of the clamour they may at first excite.* This was the answer of a great ecclesiastic

* “ Ut facile tua auctoritate et judicio calumniantium morsus reprimere possis; etsi in Proverbio sit non esse remedium adversus sycophantæ morsum. Si fortasse erunt *ματαιολόγοι*, qui cum omnium mathematicum ignari sint, tamen de illis judicium sibi sumunt, propter aliquem locum Scripturæ male ad suum propositum detortum, ausi fuerint meum hoc institutum reprehendere, ac insectari. illos nihil moror, adeo ut etiam illorum judicium, tanquam temerarium contemnam. . . Mathematica mathematicis scribuntur, quibus et hi nostri labores, si me non fallit opinio, videbuntur etiam Reipublicæ Ecclesiasticæ conducere aliquid.” *Copernici Vita*, in Opp. Gassendi, v. 451.

to the *Epistolæ obscurorum Virorum*, and to the popular scoffs at an illiterate clergy. In the same way, and in the same proud spirit of confidence in the virtue of real science as an auxiliary of true religion, the revival of the nineteenth century has been accomplished. Yet the tradition of those hundred years of the intellectual as well as political degradation of religion, from the time of Fenelon and Noris to Schlegel and De Maistre, has not yet lost all its power. There are many venerable people who still refuse to travel by steam; and there are many who cannot reconcile themselves to the alliance of the Church with that secular science which they have accustomed themselves to consider her foe. The confidence with which the men of science have asserted that religion is opposed to it, has promoted an awe of falsehood and a distrust of the power of truth. The phantom of the eighteenth century pursues many Catholics, and makes them look with suspicion upon the policy which has proved itself the best safeguard of religion.

The necessity of waging this double contest, at once with those who are of little faith and with those who have none at all,—with those who for the sake of religion fear science, and with the followers of science who despise religion,—is the fruitful cause of so much scandal and vexation in the Church. The devil must be equally gratified with the zeal of either party; for they equally serve his purpose, by confirming the fatal notion of the incompatibility of faith and reason. In reality, this pretence of antagonism is on neither side sincere. Solicitude for religion is merely a pretext for opposition to the free course of scientific research, which threatens, not the authority of the Church, but the precarious influence of individuals. The growth of knowledge cannot in the long-run be detrimental to religion; but it renders impossible the usurpation of authority by teachers who defend their own false opinions under pretence of defending the faith which they dishonour by their artifices. Such men by their narrow-minded indolence are the advocates of mental lethargy and repression, whether maintained by an inquisition such as ruined the intellectual service of religion in Spain, or by a well-organised police such as has silenced it with the significant applause of a Catholic party in France: and when they find that their influence is lessened because all men are not their dupes, instead of acknowledging that the old conflict of doctrine must be decided by the sword of science, and that the urgency of the case requires them to mend their slovenly ways, they content themselves with denouncing those who, by refusing to share in their dishonest

practice, make it the more conspicuous and the more unavailing. They impute to others the evils they themselves have caused, and do not see that the progress of error and unbelief is their own work. Partly afraid of the truth, and partly ashamed of it, they want to shelter their own ignorance by preserving that of others. But religion is not served by denying facts, or by denouncing those who proclaim them. A fire is not put out by a policeman's whistle, nor a thief taken by the cry of "Stop thief!" Truth is not the exclusive possession of the ignorant; the sun does not shine only for the blind. Authority can only condemn error; its vitality is not destroyed until it is refuted.

One of the fruits of this system is mendacity. Ignorance can only be defended by falsehood; every artifice is deemed lawful; a little fraud becomes a necessary ingredient in controversy. Hence means which only the most worthless of her adversaries have the baseness still to use, are sometimes pressed into the service of the Church by those who have not the candour or the courage to adopt that method of defence by which alone success is ultimately infallible.

The one thing needful at the present day, when science has made such progress, and has so much perfected its methods as to be far more powerful, whether for friendship or enmity, than ever before in the history of the Church, is to accept it as her necessary and trusty ally. It became hostile to Catholics only when they had rejected it. Nothing else can save religion from the twin dangers of unbelief and superstition. *Nihil veritas erubescit nisi solummodo abscondi.** The common reluctance on the part of Catholics to consent to the results of science, indicates as much a defect of faith as of knowledge. We are bound to see that the laws of true reasoning and of historical criticism are not tampered with; it is by them only we can know in their reasonableness and their integrity the doctrines which have been revealed and developed in the process of history—*juxta ordinatissimam dispositionem temporum*, says the (IV.) Council of Lateran. We have to apply to this inquiry only the methods which are developed in the pursuit of other sciences: hence there is something in the progress of all learning with which it is almost sacrilegious, or at least suicidal, to interfere in the name of religion. Nothing can be more insane or more pernicious than to insist on immediate practical advantages, on the premature harmony and conciliation of science and faith. How often has the eagerness and presumption which has based the defence of religion on proofs which later dis-

* "Truth is only ashamed of concealment." Tert. adv. Valent. 3.

coveries have exploded, covered her with the appearance of ridicule! Those who are too impatient to wait till their wine is fermented, are rewarded with a particularly nasty draught. Every branch of learning pursued for the sake of its own conclusions will result in the vindication of religion, and in the discomfiture of those who believe in their antagonism. The progress of knowledge is often more beneficial to the cause of religious truth than any professed apology. The controversial interest which formerly prevailed occupies now a very subordinate place in our literature. The old contrasts are no longer so distinctly marked. Whilst Protestantism has lost much of its dogmatic character, rationalism and infidelity have diverted the attention of disputants, and diminished their asperity. Catholics have sometimes been joined by Protestants in the defence of their common points of belief; sometimes they have found the arguments of infidels a powerful auxiliary against heresy.

When the prevailing mode of infidelity arose, it encountered no visible adversary; neither Kant nor Goethe nor Hegel found Catholicism or Protestantism either able to resist or ready to protest. The new schools of philosophy had no occasion for animosity against the Christianity which seemed already gone. Here lies the essential practical difference between the infidelity of the eighteenth century and that of the nineteenth. Voltaire and his school resolved to extirpate religion; all their writings aimed at this single end; they lied, scoffed, and blasphemed: against such adversaries there was nothing to be done, and nothing was done. They were not vulnerable by any weapon of controversy; their spirit was one that can only be exorcised by prayer and fasting. But the modern infidels generally look upon Christianity with the serenity of victors; and their indifference to its claims makes them often willing to recognise its merits. Their position towards it was not that of the pagans, who were still attached to the old mythology; but rather that of the Neoplatonists, such as Porphyry. Those philosophers did not deny that Christianity taught truths, but that it possessed the whole truth; they did not attack its doctrine because it was false, but because it claimed to be divine. In detail, they were often full of admiration for it. So there are many amongst our contemporaries who will admit almost any thing except the divine character of the Church, and object to nothing in Christianity excepting Christ. Having no religion, and recognising in history only its human aspect, they highly appreciate all that has been achieved by natural means in the pursuit of a supernatural end. In place of re-

ligious zeal, the motive of their life is the desire of scientific truth. Men of this stamp can be answered with no subterfuge; they must be beaten with their own weapons. In encountering them we have a great advantage, which fails us in conflict with Protestant theology. They assail us in the name of science; but they submit to the authority to which they appeal. They are, at least the best of them, sincere in their arguments, without the malice or the guilt of apostasy. Their objections are frequently a sign of their real love of truth; for there are many points on which they are very imperfectly answered by that system of Catholic polemics which has grown up since the Reformation in conflicts with another description of opponent. A fortress proof against battering-ram and catapult needs new defences against Lancaster guns. It has been the great benefit of the rise of the new learned infidelity, that it has greatly raised the character and increased the influence of Catholic learning.

The strongest recommendation of true science is the effect it has had in the hands of infidels themselves. When Lingard's History appeared, a much better case had been established for the mediæval Church, and her character and influence had been spoken of abroad by learned men who were not Catholics with more favour than he thought he could manifest, or his readers would accept. It is in history, the branch of learning which has most suffered from the perversions of Protestants, that the principle of impartial inquiry has achieved the greatest results. In the hands of strangers, if not of enemies, it has fought our battles better than we have ever fought them ourselves. If there were no Catholics to use it, the progress of accurate learning would result in the justification of the temporal human part of the history of the Church. All the lies of the Protestants of the sixteenth century are being rapidly refuted by their descendants of the nineteenth. If Catholics only furnish materials for the defence of the Church, there are others who will be sure to use them. A really scientifically learned work, written without any religious interest, helps the truth in spite of its author; whilst a superficial apology will do little or no good, and probably some harm, in spite of the zeal and good intention with which it is written. We have no right to be jealous of an instrument which in the hands of our enemies has turned against them, and forced them like Balaam to bear witness to the truth. The impartiality of scientific research is our surest ally if we adopt it, and if we reject it is sure to cover us with confusion. Its first fruits, the first sign that it has prevailed, will be an intelligent tolerance of error, combined

with a consciousness of the limits of our own knowledge. We must have confidence in the power of argument and reason to give victory to truth. An error, like a disease, must be brought to a crisis; it must be developed by argument, not smothered. With every undeveloped error, some truth is lost. In order that it may do its part of good in the world, and aid in promoting truth, it must be helped on to its logical results, and made to show itself in all its deformity.

The mere statement of the claims of science, and of its present character, is enough to indicate how far we are from really accepting it, and how great are the services that might now be performed by a Review that kept aloof from none of the intellectual or social problems which occupy the world. In insisting on a high standard of learning and criticism as the great object of a Catholic Quarterly, we have had also our own interest in view; for though our movements are in a more humble sphere, yet we are sensible that so long as this desideratum is not supplied, our efforts must be very imperfect, if not fruitless. We recognise and act upon a principle which it is not within the province of a journal such as ours to bring to supremacy. We have no space or opportunity to set up a theory of all that Catholic politics and literature ought to be, or to give sufficient examples of it. This is the privilege of others. We can only give conclusions which we have not always room to prove, and which ought to require no proof, and proceed upon a system which we cannot for ever be explaining and recommending. We are therefore necessarily exposed to perpetual misinterpretation. Nobody will judge us by the criterion which alone we admit, and which we wish to apply to others. In proportion as the *Dublin Review* has fallen short of the position we desire to assign it, our own position has become unnatural and difficult to maintain. When a Review is established answering in some measure to our ideal description, it will be a great benefit to the Catholics in general, but more especially a boon to us; for it will enable us fairly to pursue our proper ends, and occupy our legitimate place: and therefore we need scarcely say how glad we are to hear that a new arrangement is on the point of taking place, and that an infusion of young blood is likely to give new vitality to our old and respected Review. Without any feelings of envy, and renouncing the idea of competition, we shall cordially hail the appearance of a worthy representative of our intellectual culture, and shall anxiously look for the announcement of wider views and an enlarged plan. The great question has hitherto been, not *what* principle shall prevail, but whether

principles shall prevail at all. We are not alive to censure in particulars where we know that our fundamental ideas are not admitted. Our premises are denied, it is idle to defend our conclusions. The discussion of a point of learning is superfluous and hopeless where no respect for the freedom and authority of learning exists; all such controversies have generally a very subordinate and contemptible character. In this respect, therefore, we have nothing to modify. But we wish it to be distinctly understood that the *Rambler* is not a theological Review, and that we do not design to treat questions of theology, or to transgress that line which separates secular from religious knowledge. The principle of independent inquiry, within the bounds, and for the promotion, of the Catholic faith, it is our pride and our duty to maintain; the more because the obloquy we thereby incur shows how urgently such advocacy is needed. Speaking for no party ourselves, we naturally excite the dislike of all partisans. Doubtless we shall incense many soothing prejudices and contradict many cherished opinions, and shall continue objects of aversion to all who are more attached to persons than to principles, to habits than to ideas. Whoever defies an idol, must be prepared for the clamour of its worshippers; nobody who assails folly and error is surprised at being answered by a falsehood or an insult. These, we well know, besides personal imputations and calumnies which it is infamy to utter, are the fit and natural weapons of many adversaries of the ideas which we defend. But though every human enterprise in which there is no proportion between the trouble and the chance of success is wisely abandoned, it is not so with the higher service to which our efforts are devoted. They are supported by a more powerful encouragement than the immediate prospect of success. Under all circumstances we shall keep in mind the example of forbearance set us by a great and holy man on a very memorable occasion. In that remarkable autobiography, which seems to have been the great obstacle to his canonisation, Cardinal Bellarmine relates how he returned good for evil to the Pope, who, after highly applauding his learning, had ended by putting his best work on the Index.* The edition of the Vulgate which Sixtus V.

* "Anno 1591, cum Gregorius XIV. cogitaret quid agendum esset de Bibliis a Sixto V. editis, in quibus erant permulta perperam mutata, non deerant viri graves qui censerent ea Biblia esse publice prohibenda; sed N. (Bellarminus) coram Pontifice demonstravit Biblia illa non esse prohibenda, sed esse ita corrigenda, ut salvo honore Sixti V. Pontificis Biblia illa emendata proderentur, quod fieret si quam celerrime tollerentur quæ male mutata erant, et Biblia recuderentur sub nomine ejusdem Sixti, et addita præfatione, qua significaretur, in prima editione Sixti præ festinatione irrepsisse aliqua errata vel typographorum, vel

had prepared, was found after his death to be so full of faults, that some were for prohibiting it altogether. But, in order to save his memory from this indignity, Bellarmine undertook to correct it himself; showing how little he was moved by the intemperate attack of which he had been the object, and exhibiting an instance of generosity and forgiveness of injury which deserves to be remembered.

MARTINEAU'S STUDIES OF CHRISTIANITY.*

THE volume before us deserves attention for the position and the acquirements of its author. Mr. James Martineau, a relation of the more celebrated Miss Martineau, is a Unitarian minister, well known at Liverpool by his preaching, and more widely known by his writings, as may be seen by the present volume, which has been selected and arranged from the author's scattered essays by an American admirer, who evidently thinks that in their connected teaching he has discovered the true portrait, the real lineaments of the Church of the future.

Any intelligent man's anticipation of the future of Christendom is interesting to us Catholics, who know there is only one possible universal Christianity for past or future, chiefly as giving us a picture of the tendencies of the particular set of persons whom he represents, and furnishing us with the means of testing the special difficulties we have to encounter in attempting to recommend our religion to minds so constituted and habituated; while a minor point of interest consists in examining the figure which we ourselves make in the eyes of those without,—in looking at ourselves not only in the glass of our own reflections, which are very often too partial, but also in the drawings of all the limners and caricaturists who profess to exhibit our portrait on their canvas.

Not that the claims of the Catholic Church can be appreciated by a mere external examiner; for "the kingdom of God is within us." And yet the first rule of most of our self-constituted judges is, that, in order to see clearly and

aliorum; et sic N. (Bellarminus) reddidit Sixto Pontifici bona pro malis. Sixtus enim propter illam propositionem de dominio Papæ directo in totum orbem posuit controversias ejus in Indice librorum prohibitorum, donec corrigerentur; sed ipso mortuo Sacra Rituum Congregatio jussit deleri ex libro Indicis nomen illius. Placuit consilium N. (Bellarmini) Gregorio Pontifici." Vita Ven. Card. Rob. Bellarmini, S.J., quam ipsemet scripsit, p. 22.

* *Studies of Christianity; a Series of Original Papers, now first collected or new.* By James Martineau. London: Longmans.

determine precisely what is within us, they must resolutely keep outside of us. They must come down upon us from above, and stand on a higher ground than that we occupy, in order to take a bird's-eye view of us, and draw our map. "The controversies of the hour are but ill understood by one who remains enclosed within them, and judges them only on their own assumptions." Our principles must not be learned by a practical acquaintance; they must be watched from the heights of philosophical speculation, which tower and domineer over all the partial truths of particular religious systems. He that makes "studies of Christianity" must not *enter into* the phase of thought which he watches, but must keep outside it; he must not submit his conscience to it, must not receive it as part of his consciousness; must not experience its workings, and thus feel and know intimately what it is; but must only watch its manifestations—see as far as he can what it does, observe its phenomena, catalogue its effects, and tabulate its statistics. Yet when we seek to know Christianity, it is not the statistics of its manifestations that we seek, but its inward power over the soul. And this inward power, though it evidently can only be known by inward experience, Mr. Martineau insists upon discovering by the outward experiments of positivism. Thus he jumbles together two incompatible philosophies, both true in their place, and strives to extract a spiritualist conclusion from a materialist process. Nor can it be fairly retorted that the Catholic is as amenable to this criticism as the non-Catholic; we do not profess to be seeking for religious truth, but to have found it: those who are still seeking are bound to prove all things, not so those who have found. Our desire to understand other religions can be only either literary or missionary; for the sake of mere knowledge, or for the good of those we wish to convert. It cannot be for our practice, because we seek nothing better than what we have. And for this merely theoretical knowledge we have, as Mr. Martineau owns, ample data; our religion satisfies the three great human tendencies, which corrupt into Deism, pantheism, or passion. By our reflection we can develop these tendencies, without adopting the development in practice; just as a poet can develop a wicked character in his drama without adopting the wickedness. But besides these human elements, there is a supernatural element in our religion, of which Mr. Martineau is ignorant: and yet he refuses to make trial of it, and experience for himself whether this element is real or not; *primâ facie* he is, therefore, deficient in one of the necessary data for judging of us; while we have all the data for judging of him, and only require

intellectual power and cultivation to put our judgment into words.

But if a historian of human opinion insists upon using Mr. Martineau's process, he is forced to characterise all phases of thought, not by their interior workings, but by their external development: he can only know the thought in its history; its development is its essence; if the development had been different, the thought could not have been the same. The actual event was the one only possible, and the necessary manifestation of the existing thought, which could not exhibit itself in any other way. Thus, in the sixteenth century, we are told, "the coexistence of two churches in one Christendom passed into a necessity, and reformation proved impossible without a schism." What was, was also, in Mr. Martineau's eyes, necessary; and was therefore right. On such a scheme historical judgment is impossible, except by a happy inconsistency.

Consider again the impossibility of the pretended position of such a judge. He is a reasonable being, and as such may be supposed to be searching for the truth; if not, his criticism is aimless. He owns, by the fact of searching, that he has not yet found the truth; indeed, if he had, it would be a touchstone for him to try all systems by. And as he does not use this compendious test, it is to be presumed that he does not pretend to have yet arrived at the possession of the truth. But while he thus confesses that his position is below the level of the truth, he at the same time assumes that it is higher than all the opinions which have ever been accounted truths; for he professes to regard them from a "higher point." Hence, though he claims to have climbed higher towards truth than any of his predecessors, he owns that he has not reached it; if their attempts were failures, his is a failure likewise.

But how can he prove that all previous attempts are failures? What test has he to apply? With his positivist process, he can only judge by external results. What external fact would be the natural and inevitable result of one man or many attaining to a knowledge of truth in the supernatural order? Till this is specified and proved, he has no ground for any argument whatever. Instead of proving that no one has attained truth, his argument would rather demonstrate that every one had attained it. No thought is a failure which has attained its aim; but no thought, and therefore no aim, can be known to a positivist inquirer except by its external results: as he knows no more of thought than has realised itself, he is bound to consider that it had no further

aim than that which it has accomplished. All verbal expressions of its aspirations must either be interpreted by the event, or eliminated as belonging, not to thought, but to passion. To him, therefore, the fact accomplished is the whole manifestation of the thought, with all its properties and accidents, its aims, colours, and characters. No thought can be said to have failed in its aim, because its aim must be presumed to have been to do what it has done, and nothing else. As, according to Hume, the Creator cannot be proved to be any stronger or any better than His limited and imperfect creation proves Him to be, so no positivist ought to allow that any thought has failed, because it was only so far a thought or an intention as it succeeded: at least, this is all that can be known or criticised without entering into the spirit of the thought, appropriating it, and living and acting it out. But this is just what Mr. Martineau has determined not to do. To him, then, the thought is no failure, because he must suppose it has done just what it wanted to do, neither less nor more; and yet he pronounces it to be a failure, and that only because its results do not come up to a certain arbitrary standard, which he, simply to please his own fancy, has set up as the measure and test of the action of truth.

And what is this test? Its first character is one that Catholics also reckon to be a note of the true Church; but we reckon that unity amongst all those that profess the true doctrine is necessary, whereas Mr. Martineau requires truth to produce unity even among those who do not hold it. "If unity be the character of truth," he begins, "no generation was ever so far gone in errors as our own." If unity tests truth, the amount of disunion measures the amount of error; and a disunion so universal as that of the present age proves that there is no truth at all in the world! According to this standard, if there were unity in a universal error, there would be more truth in the world than there is now. But though truth is at union with itself, not every system which is at union with itself is true. Though truth unites those that hold it, not all that are united by an opinion hold the truth. Men may unite to propagate a monstrous lie, and may quarrel about the most insignificant accidental trappings of a truth which they hold in common. Disunion does not prove the world to be further gone in error than formerly; for the sundering errors may be slighter, may be rather misunderstandings than wrong principles. Still less does disunion prove that not one of the sundered parties holds the truth. Men have free-will to accept or reject the truth, if offered; that many, or most, have rejected it, does not prove that it

has not been offered ; if all exercise free-will, it is certain that some will determine one way and some another : truth in this case is the cause of disunion, and if we could always trace the effect to its cause, disunion might be the sign, the note, and the proof of the presence of truth, for the Truth has said, " I am not come to send peace, but rather division." Division, then, does not advance by one step the proof that truth has never been offered, and therefore is vainly urged by Mr. Martineau to justify his resolution to hold aloof from all opinions now in the world, and to judge of them from the outside, without any attempt to enter into them and experience them from within. To judge Catholic principles from within, a man must become a Catholic. But this would not suit Mr. Martineau's purpose. So he argues : Disunion is the fact of our age, and is therefore the expression of the divine thought and intention, and therefore, again, is good. Whatever is, is necessary ; disunion is a necessity, and instead of deserving to be reviled and opposed, " constitutes in itself a new problem, not undeserving the closest study and reflection." Disunion is to be accounted for on Christian principles, and accepted and defended as an integral part of true religion.

And how is the problem of disunion solved ? " We hazard no theory of religion in saying that there is a natural correspondence between the genius of a people and the form of their belief ;" the form of faith is the product of the popular genius, not the popular genius a creature of the people's faith : " each mood of mind brings its own wants and aspirations, colours its own ideal, and interprets best that part of life and the universe with which it is in sympathy : " each mood of mind asks its own questions, and fabricates its own answers. And these answers being the so-called revealed truth, revelation is but a fabrication ; each man bears its natural oracle in his breast, and the responses vary according to the great division of mankind to which the person belongs.

There are four such divisions of mankind, founded on four distinct temperaments or prevailing moods, which give rise to four different theological biases. The scientific temperament interests itself in truths of the physical order, and by the mere exclusion of metaphysical curiosity tends to atheism. This temperament has as yet no home in Christianity, and is at the bottom of all the jealousy between faith and science. But the three following are the " factors " of Christianity : the conscientious temperament, where the sense of right is supreme, and which tends to deism ; the artistic temperament, ruled by the sense of beauty, and tending to pantheism ; the passionate temperament, swayed by tempe-

tuous impulses, and tending to a sacrificial religion. These temperaments are not only distinct, but mutually hostile. Thus the passionate temperament tends to subvert the religion of conscience; the stormy intensity of remorse so exaggerates the strictness of the law of duty against which it has sinned, that it overleaps it and falls on the other side. It no sooner confesses that it ought to have obeyed, than it declares that it could not obey, and looks about for a substitute for obedience. This it finds in sacrifice, which in its original institution had no propitiatory meaning, according to Mr. Martineau's arbitrary external view of history.*

These three temperaments, however hostile to each other, were all concerned as the "factors," creators, and constituent elements of Christian doctrine. First appeared the "Hebrew element," the theistic conscience, which characterised the "Ebionitish period" of the Church, and led to a scrupulous and ascetic exaggeration of ethical principles. Then the Greek element of pantheistic speculation filtered in through the Alexandrian schools, and reigned through the "Logos period" of dogmatic theology. Lastly the Roman element of passionate appropriation of redemption by faith ruled the Latin or Augustinian period of the Church. These three factors each formed a theology for themselves, and have left it as a legacy to the Church. The ethical element created the Catholic theory of human nature, the pantheistic element created the scheme of supernatural grace, while the sacrificial element defined the Christian conditions of redemption. Thus of the three great religious temperaments of mankind each finds something to satisfy it in the Church. Still, though "this comprehensive adaptation to the exigencies of mankind is a reasonable object of admiration, nothing can be more absurd than the appeal to it in proof either of preternatural guidance or of human artifice in the constitutive process of the Roman Church."

The validity of this view depends upon certain assumptions which take for granted the exact points in dispute: as, first,

* With Mr. Martineau's views of history it may be well to contrast those of a really great man, the Baron d'Eckstein (to whom we are indebted for some of the most valuable articles that have appeared in our pages): "All men, to whatever grade of civilisation they belong, started from a common principle of purification, or expiation, which led them to the idea of sacrifice. There, and only there (we can prove it), is the origin of the home and the family, the true principle of all the primitive social institutions, of the religious and civil discipline, of the ritual of private as well as that of public life. There is the real meaning of the ceremonial imposed on the peoples of antiquity. All this is gradually effaced by the current of civilisation; but it is still found, at least in germ, in different degrees, and in varying colours, even in the midst of barbarism, even in the ranks of savage life." *Correspondant*, Dec. 1858, p. 497.

that revelation is not a supernatural communication made to man, but a natural product of his "temperaments." Secondly, that, historically, all Christian doctrine was not developed simultaneously, but that its severe ethical code first arose; next, that its theological dogma was superadded; and when this was done, that its sacrificial character was brought to light. This is an assumption which history can easily dispose of. A third assumption is, that these three developments are contrary to each other, form no organic whole, and cannot be held in combination by any reasonable man: that "which is dignified by the name of Catholic doctrine" is a "strange congeries of profound truths and puerile fancies;" it "has no intrinsic or necessary unity;" it has "something for conscience, something for art, something for passion, in turn, but cannot satisfy them all together." The mystic rejects the sacrificial scheme of redemption and the Christian law; the moralist rejects the sacrifice and the sacramental mysteries; the sacrificialist rejects both morals and sacraments; no Catholic could believe all Catholic doctrine unless he were forced and dragonaded by a sacerdotal corporation. Catholicity is a religious comprehension, a coalition to make contraries look the same, and to secure an outward agreement where there is no other unity, like the evangelical establishment of Prussia.

Mr. Martineau expects that his Church of the future will be free from this fault, and will satisfy all the three temperaments together. Such is the condition that he requires as the test of a true system. We accept the challenge, and affirm that Catholicity, looked at from within instead of from without, understood as we understand it, not as he arbitrarily explains it, satisfies the test in a very surprising way. So far from the great system of Catholic doctrine being a congeries of contradictory elements, forced on us from without, the fact is, as many of us who have received it when adults can testify from personal experience, that to a very great extent it grew up from within, without books, without teachers, and that when we came to compare the development within us with that which the Church required us to confess, we were awed and delighted to find that the two things were identical. The Abbé Alphonsus Ratisbonne declares of himself, that in one memorable moment, in the church of St. Andrea delle Fratte at Rome, the clouds which hid the truth from him suddenly disappeared, and he saw it all. "Without the least knowledge of the letters or words, I yet saw through the sense and spirit of the doctrines." His instructor had nothing new to teach him; he knew it all beforehand. Dr. Newman

insists upon an analogous, silent, interior, and independent growth of Christian doctrine, or the state of mind which anticipates and eagerly drinks it in, as the great evidence of the supernatural reality of Christianity. This it is that subdues the mind of his Callista. This he often draws out, as in his sermon on the "Secret Power of Divine Grace," where he shows how Christianity came

"by an inward and intimate visitation; by outward instruments, indeed, but with effects far higher than those instruments. . . . The Omnipotent and Omniscient touched many hearts at once, and in many places. They forthwith, one and all, *spoke one language*,—*not learning it one from the other* so much as taught by Himself the canticle of the Lamb; or if by men's teaching too, yet catching and mastering it spontaneously, almost before the words were spoken. . . . The perplexed world searched about in vain whence came that concord of sweet and holy sounds. Upon the first word of the preacher, upon a hint, upon a mere whisper in the air, a deep response came from many lips,—a deep, full, and ready harmony of many voices, one and all proclaiming the Saviour of men: . . . for He was walking the earth; He was scattering His gifts freely, and *multiplying His image*. . . . The despised, the hated influence, insinuated itself every where; the leaven spread, and none could stay it; and in the most unlikely places . . . one and all, by a secret power, became the prey of the Church."

So this system, which challenges the obedience of all by the token of its unity in the plurality of minds and its spontaneous identity of development in the most diverse dispositions, is said by Mr. Martineau to be so wanting in internal unity, as to be only saved by the external and violent pressure of a priesthood! That the priesthood is a necessary condition of its preservation through successive generations, we loudly profess and proclaim. They are the gardeners who sow the seed, and who watch over and prune the plant. But it is God that gives the increase, and makes the plant grow, and bud, and blossom, and fructify according to its kind, by the sweet influences of an internal grace that breathes where it lists. To tell us that our terrible priests force upon us at the point of the cassock a creed full of contradictions, at which we laugh in our sleeve while we swallow them with a reverent grimace, is a grotesque falsehood, that could only suggest itself to one who merely looks at us from without, and measures the inward grace of Christ and the teaching unction of the Spirit by a foot-rule or a quart mug.

At the same time, it must be owned that there is a foundation of truth, if not of originality, in Mr. Martineau's dreams;—for M. Guizot had already given the catalogue of the three

“factors” of religion : first, the “religious sentiment ;” secondly, “the desire of the solution of the problems of human destinies, and of the discovery of the creeds and doctrines which contain, or are supposed to contain it ;” and thirdly, “the necessity of seeking for morals a sanction, an origin, and an aim.” Religion, therefore, “assumes many other forms besides that of pure sentiment ; it is also a union of doctrines, of precepts, of promises.”* The sentiment is the artistic poetic element ; the moral and the dogmatic elements correspond exactly with Mr. Martineau’s divisions. The assumption that the developments of these three elements in the Church have resulted in a self-contradictory system, though grounded on a specious reference to the known divergences in the Catholic schools, is a ludicrously “bad shot.” The contradictions are in the developments of the same element, not in the developments of the different elements. There is nothing contradictory between the “Logos theology” and either extreme of the Latin anthropology. Augustine and Petavius could take an equal interest in theology proper. Nor is there any contradiction between ethics and the scheme of redemption. The contradiction occurs in the developments of the same doctrines. It is a fact, that different men are led by the constitution of their minds to interest themselves in different sides of Christianity, and to develop in different ways the various elements of the unchangeable faith. Some are attracted to dogma, which they develop in various ways, and give rise to the various dogmatic schools ; others feel drawn to morals, and originate the contrary ethical schools ; others to mysticism and religious sentiment, which they develop in contrary senses. But every one of these persons, however and whatever he develops, must always cling to the fixed point ; securely attached to this solid bottom, speculation may swing freely in all directions without harm, like a ship riding at anchor. Now the Catholic doctrine is this foundation of dogma, ethics, and grace, to which a man must be anchored before he can safely follow his inclination to the special developments of a particular school ; whereas the sentimentalist ceases to be religious in discarding dogma and morals, the moralist ceases to be religious in discarding dogma and mystery, the dogmatist ceases to be religious in discarding morals and grace. While the central truth is held, every one may employ his talents and may indulge his inclinations in its developments, without any substantial breach of unity ; when the central truth is discarded, every shade of difference in these developments constitutes a formal division.

* Guizot, *European Civilisation*, lect. v.

Just as the Englishman who is faithful to the constitution of his country must talk like a monarchist in defending the Crown, like an aristocrat for the Lords, like a democrat for the Commons, so as to be taken for all three in turn by an ill-instructed listener, while in reality he is neither monarchist, aristocrat, nor democrat, but simply and honestly an English constitutionalist; so an external examiner like Mr. Martineau may very likely accuse the Catholic of inconsistency because he enlarges in turn upon the three great branches of the Catholic system,—because, while he is speaking as an artist or a poet, enlarging on the sentiment and the mystery of Christianity, on the sacraments, on the universality of grace, on the ministrations of angels and saints, on the hierarchy of sacred orders, he may use language which in another mouth would be pantheistic, but which is assuredly not pantheistic in one whose soul is anchored to the whole Catholic truth. Because, again, when enlarging on the law of morals and justice, when appreciating Aristotle, Plato, and Confucius, and giving a just praise to heathen ethics and worldly honour and justice, he may seem to forget the transcendent value of Christianity and to speak as a deist, while the heart anchored on the rock knows how far it is from that cold formal heresy; or because, in moments of passion or deeper devotion, when he appropriates to himself the graces and the promises of religion, he may speak in an exclusive way, for which he will be reproached as a predestinarian and a Calvinist, which he can never really be while he is a sound Catholic,—in spite of this mere external inconsistency, to an internal view, to one who will enter into the spirit of our belief, every thing is in the most perfect harmony.

There is a similar perverted reflection of truth in Mr. Martineau's idea of the tyranny and monopoly of the priesthood in matters of Catholic thought. We honour and obey the priesthood as the divinely constituted guardian of the central truth, and as authorised from time to time to enlarge its boundaries by taking in the developments which heretical opposition has brought into prominence and Christian consciousness has accepted as integral parts of revealed truth. But historically the priesthood has neither claimed the initiative nor been the originator of each development. Dogma, ethics, Christian mysticism, and poetry, have always been taken up and cultivated by any one who felt he had the talents or the deep interest which seemed to call him to the study; and it was not till a definite tangible result had been obtained that his work or his theory was submitted to sacerdotal decision. The greatest movements in the Church have been con-

ceived and planned by laymen: the Fathers in the desert, Basil in Pontus, Benedict at Subiaco, Francis at Assisi, Ignatius at Manresa, Philip Neri in the Catacombs and at the Trinità dei Pellegrini, were not yet ecclesiastics. As laymen they had meditated, planned, and communicated with others of like mind. In dogma, all that has been, or is about to be, defined by the Church belongs to the sacerdotal authority; but in that immense field of doctrinal speculation which is outside this limit, Christian thought is as free for the layman as for the clergyman. We are not covertly asserting our own rights, for we disclaim being considered as theological writers; but we cannot reply to Mr. Martineau without noting the fact, that both in and out of the Church laymen have been the recognised founders and spokesmen of schools of philosophy which bordered close on theology, and often passed within its limits. Run through the list of the authors of the *Evangelical Demonstrations*, published in the Abbé Migne's twenty quartos; there you will find, by the side of St. Augustine, Bossuet, and Wiseman, the names not only of Catholic laymen like Descartes, Moore, and Manzoni, but of people branded with unhappy notes like Tertullian and Origen; of Protestants like Grotius, Leibnitz, and Littleton; even of Protestant ministers like Butler, Paley, and Buckland. St. Augustine praised the Donatist Tichonius as the then most scientific expositor of Scripture, and the Christian world has adopted several Protestant apologists as among the best defenders of the truth of Christianity; yet Mr. Martineau says that lay thought is not permitted to occupy itself about matters of doctrine, when even the thought of heretics on these matters has been gladly accepted by Catholics. Certainly it is true that human reason is a proper critic only of the evidences of revelation, and not of its representations of the absolute and divine truths; but this is as true for clerical as for lay reason: all Catholics start with the hearty admission of all revealed truths defined as such; the divergence only comes when we consider these in relation to the actual wants and circumstances of man. Now this relation makes itself as intimately felt in layman as in priest: as men, one has the same difficulties, the same temptations, as the other; their reason is equal, their education and preparation may be equal. No Catholic ever attributed to one a right or power of thinking which he denied to the other;* nay, in such a case, if the

* If knowledge belonged to the clergyman by any supernatural influx connected with his orders or jurisdiction, of course its fullness would belong to the Pope; and then how shall we account for Bellarmine's rebuke, administered to Clement VIII. in the matter of the Congregations *de auxiliis div. gr.*: "Ipse N.

right of thinking is denied to either party, it is the priest who is less free. If he goes wrong, the scandal, the ruin, is of a parish; the layman only upsets himself, and perhaps his family.

A consistent development of Mr. Martineau's sketch of Catholic thought patented by the clergy would lead to some highly amusing results. Without thought there can be no faith; therefore faith would be a clerical monopoly. Faith cannot be tried without probation; and the probation of faith is either external by persecution, or internal by doubt; therefore martyrdom and doubt would also be exclusively clerical privileges. Doubt, the shadow of belief, the touchstone of its value, the proof of its substance, is that which, when not properly exorcised, degenerates into heresy; and as heresies must come for the trial of faith, on Mr. Martineau's supposition no one but a clergyman can be a heretic, for no one else can presume to think or speak on matters involving heresy. We have known a Catholic man of letters entertain similar sentiments on historical grounds. An exaggerator of the episcopal sphere was once unctuously affirming to him that at no time had any Bishop been known to write in opposition to the Immaculate Conception. "Very odd," replied our friend, "I had fancied that all heresies were headed by a Bishop, except one, which was called the heresy of the Acephali, or headless ones, on account of this unique distinction." Mr. Martineau must allow us to observe, that both for priest and layman the truth holds good that faith must be tried; that it is only by not cultivating the intellect at all, or by forcibly suppressing it, that we can avoid intellectual trials; and that to do this is precisely analogous to Origen's unlawful method of shirking carnal trials. Our whole nature is a trust; in it, and not outside of it, we must be tried and proved; we may no more kill it in part, to avoid a part of our probation, than commit suicide upon the whole to escape our whole probation. Vocation to the exercise of reason and thought, even on religious matters, has always been reckoned quite independent of vocation to the ecclesiastical state.

In the domain of art and poetry, in all that concerns the sentiment of Christianity, the freedom of thought is still greater. There was room in the Church for Dante, Rafaele, Michael Angelo, and even for that tawdry Frenchman Chateaubriand, without any jealous inquiry whether the initiative belonged to the clergy or not. All the thinkers we have

sæpe admonuit pontificem ut caveret fraudes, et ut non putaret se studio proprio, cum theologus non esset, posse ad intelligentiam rei obscurissimæ pervenire."
Vita Venerabilis Cardinalis Rob. Bellarmini, S.J., quam ipsemet scripsit, p. 31.

mentioned found, or might have found, a home in the Church; the judgment which has accepted their words after their death would never have silenced their speech while they were living, except under the influence of the false, sinister, and lamentable prejudice which Mr. Martineau propagates, that we are only kept in the unity of faith by the numbing, thought-destroying influence of a domineering priesthood.

We have been occupied so long over the preliminaries, that we have scarcely room even to glance at the substance of these Studies. Suffice it to say, that the author makes the Reformation the commencement of the restoration of ruined Christianity. Ethics had been discredited by casuistry (Mr. Martineau volunteers an *alibi* in favour of the Jesuits); art had become pagan; only passion remained, which Luther seized as the great factor of religion for the first, or "Puritan, period" of the revival. Then came the second, or ethical, period of Grotius, Cudworth, Tillotson, Clarke, and Butler, who always asked what things are for, and missed seeing what they are; who searched for motives and missed the look, and could never rise to the artistic contemplation of objects and events, of which science seeks the origin, morals the drift, and art the nature—not imposing their significance, but reading it off, and detecting in them not a purpose, but a sentiment. This is the mission of the third, or pantheistic, period of Protestantism, whose prophets are Hegel and Emerson. The fourth, or Martineau, period will be one in which these three are combined and harmonised, with the addition of a spice of scientific atheism.

After this endeavour to determine the "distinctive types," and lay out the "ground-plan of modern Christian development," the outline is filled in with a sketch of the coming "Christianity, without priest and without ritual," with a fierce onslaught on the scheme of "vicarious redemption" and of "mediatorial religion," and with the five doctrinal points that constitute the creed, or rather the charter, of the new religion. These are: 1. the truth of the moral perceptions in man, not their depravity; 2. the moral perfection of God in opposition to arbitrary decrees and absolute self-will; 3. the natural awakening of the Divine Spirit within us, not its preternatural communication from without; 4. Christ the pure image and highest revelation of the Eternal Father, not His victim and His contrast; 5. a universal immortality after the model of Christ's heavenly life.

It would be easy to show the heresies—the Pelagianism, the Pantheism, the Socinianism, the Universalism—of these points. But this would be beside our object; in giving them

we only wish to show what are the rough edges of popular Protestantism which especially grate against the thoughtful men for whom Mr. Martineau writes, in order that our controversialists should be ready with their files for the same edges. We know quite well that the Church has answers in her armory which entirely take the wind out of Mr. Martineau's sails, which include all the truth he utters, and destroy all the errors he attacks.

Mr. Martineau's Christian morals are better than his dogmas. His maxim is, "not law, but love:"

"Love to God, to Christ, not simply for what they have done for us, but chiefly for what they are in themselves; nothing like the narrow-hearted gratitude for an exclusive salvation, but a *moral* affection, awakened by their holiness, rectitude, truth, and mercy,—by the sublimity and spirituality of their designs, and the sanctity and fidelity of their execution: love also to man, looking to him not merely as a sentient being who is to be made *happy*, but as a child of God, who is to be raised into some likeness to the Divine Image; as a brother spirit, noble in nature, even though sinful in fact."

Here again we may learn something from the points of attack against the popular moral code of Calvinism selected by the philosophic Unitarian. There is no doubt that here his teaching is substantially the same as ours, and that if he represents the spirit of a coming age, the Church will be able to conciliate it. We do not conceal from ourselves the dangers of adapting ourselves to the spirit of the age; Jansenism arose mainly from the honest desire of controversialists to render Catholic doctrine as little bitter as possible to the Calvinistic spirit of the age. A similar desire might now engender an opposite heresy. Still, it is not without its use to watch the contests between heretics, and to mark where one attacks another with Catholic weapons more or less disfigured, or where popular errors find their best antidotes in Catholic principles slenderly disguised. It might perhaps show us which is the vulnerable place in our enemies' line; it might enable us to discover, that while our own controversialists often beat the air in refuting exploded heresies, an heretical preacher had just hit on the weak points of popular English religion, and was applying to some of them the antagonist principles, which only a Catholic can develop with precision and effect.

THE ROYAL COMMISSION AND THE "TABLET."

REGARD for the momentous interests at stake overcomes our settled disinclination to defensive controversy with contemporaries, and induces us to revert to the question of the Royal Commission on Education in connection with an attack upon ourselves in the *Tablet*. Conscious of rectitude, we can afford to be called "weak," "corrupt," and "servile;" but we cannot consent to abandon the real welfare of the Catholic body to sophistry and declamation.

The *Tablet* frankly admits that no religious principle forbids coöperation with the Commission. This is an admission of immense importance. Unless our memory deceive us, there have before now appeared stirring articles, unfurling the banner of religion, blowing the trumpet of war, and crying, "God defend the right!" In the prayer we join from our heart; and it is a relief to find that no attempt will be made to degrade the sacred interests of religion by enlisting them upon the wrong side. In politics, religious men, unless all history be a fable, may be mistaken; and it is not treasonable to anticipate the recurrence of what has already happened so often. Had it been possible to allege any Catholic principle against the Commission, we should, at whatever risk, have obeyed the dictates of conscience in resisting its influence and repudiating its overtures. But it is not so. By the testimony of the *Tablet* no religious principle is at stake.

The *Tablet* further affirms, that the advantages of coöperation with the Commission are obvious and admitted. It seems even a little indignant with us for our pains in sketching these advantages, so obvious are they, and so much a matter of course. This, then, we have gained from our contemporary,—coöperation with the Commission will be manifestly advantageous to Catholics, and no religious principle stands in the way. One would think the conclusion inevitable, that Catholics should not hesitate to coöperate with the Commission.

Not so, however, reasons the *Tablet*. On the contrary, our contemporary asserts that the question has been decided by those with whom the decision rests, and that Catholics are now called on, not to advise what shall be done, but to help in carrying out a plan that has been deliberately adopted. It would be a mockery to affect ignorance of the meaning of these allusions. We may say, however, that no decision on

the question has been made public, and no plan submitted to the laity for support. Meantime we decline to infer the sentiments of Bishops from hints in newspapers; respect for the hierarchy leads us rather to regard as wisely tentative and provisional whatever views may have been entertained upon a question which avowedly involves no religious principle, and which we know from undoubted testimony to have been neither thoroughly discussed nor properly understood. Had the point been one of faith or morals, it could not be said to have been "decided by those with whom the decision rests" while Rome has not spoken. Being what it actually is, we shall be surprised indeed to learn that our Bishops, whose rule is so truly paternal, are displeased by the loyal expression of opinions entertained by many Catholics, and supported by arguments which cannot be met. The clever introduction of a quotation from the *Rambler* in juxtaposition with a reference to the Bishops, makes us appear guilty of a scoffing allusion to the English episcopate. The trick is rhetorical, but disingenuous. In speaking of those who seem gratified by mischief, we meant not the Bishops, whose prudence in relations with Government has been so conspicuous, but that small though noisy party among us, ever eager for strife, who on this question of the Royal Commission do not hesitate to argue that, "since Catholics must sooner or later fight the State about education, we may as well fight now, whether right or wrong;" and who declare themselves ready to sacrifice all that in the last fifteen years has been gained for poor Catholic children under constant episcopal sanction, if only they secure an opportunity of displaying their own independence and pugnacity.

Such a party, were it to grow in numbers and prominence, would, by pushing measures in England which Catholics in France, Spain, Austria, and Naples never dream of adopting, do much to confirm the impression that Catholics make bad citizens of a free state, and would inflict irreparable injury upon English Catholic interests, which will be best promoted by respect towards the civil authority, consideration for others, and justice and moderation in our own claims. In religion we cannot yield an inch. The Church of God alone is true; all else is false. But in the prosecution of social or political objects, the I-am-right-and-you-are-wrong method of argument will earn nothing but ridicule.

Again, the *Tablet* insinuates that we blame the Bishops for the culpable neglect which, if it be important to Catholic interests that one of our body should sit upon the Commission, was certainly perpetrated when all warnings of the com-

ing appointments were disregarded, and no claim made for the nomination of a Catholic until the Commission was actually gazetted, and it had become all but impossible that the claim could be entertained. But so long ago as 1847, when first Catholics were received into amicable relations with the British Government upon educational questions, the Vicars-Apostolic nominated a Committee to be their organ of communication with Government upon the subject of education. Surely, then, it was the duty of the *Catholic Poor-School Committee* to watch the signs of the proposed Commission, to call together its members and debate the question, and (if such had been the issue of the Committee's deliberations) to demand with all its influence the appointment of a Catholic commissioner. Its course, we are informed, has been very different. Up to this moment no general meeting of members has been held; and upon a subject which wears a most serious aspect, which properly belongs to it as the Catholic organ of communication with Government, and which possesses an importance immeasurably superior to the annual distribution of a few hundreds among the loudest claimants, it has virtually abdicated its functions. For many months we have regretted that the *Poor-School Committee* communicates so rarely with its supporters and the public, and finds so few opportunities to rouse and inform the Catholic body upon educational questions, which never demanded more attentive care than now; but we should not have expressed our dissatisfaction thus plainly, had not the *Tablet* so pointedly challenged the inquiry, who were the leaders charged with neglect in omitting to present a seasonable claim for the appointment of a Catholic commissioner. We distinctly reply, that the charge lies against the managers of the *Poor-School Committee*, and not against others.

The *Tablet* accepts our sketch of the origin of the Commission as accurate, but objects to it as unnecessary, because "no misconception exists." Our experience leads to an opposite conclusion. Few ecclesiastics or laymen have been aware that the Commission originated in an address of the House of Commons, and emanates from the Crown; they commonly regard it as acting under the authority of Lord Derby's administration; and not a few suppose it to be connected with the Privy Council, and alarm themselves with the fancy that its investigations indicate a love of encroachment in that department of State. The distinction is very material. Had the administration alone been concerned, we might expect safety in a change of ministry; emanating as it does from the Queen's authority, the Commission is quite independent

of administrations, and were Lord Derby to resign to-morrow, the Commission would not be in any way affected by the change. Again, as the Commission was issued by the Queen to satisfy the House of Commons, there seems small chance that the opposition of a minority—even if it could secure powerful expression—will obtain favour in Parliament. Neither change of ministry nor debate in Parliament affords escape from the Commission. On the other hand, the dread of the Commission as in any way acting under, or in collusion with, the Privy-Council department, is quite chimerical. The Commission has the Privy Council before it on trial; and Mr. Formby, or any other opponent of the latter body, would be an acceptable witness with the former; and the true way to resist encroachment is to give evidence against it as undesired, as well as to prove it unnecessary by the rapid increase and successful conduct of schools under present plans. We have not observed a general comprehension of the facts of the case; and indeed the *Tablet* itself, while professing to be free from misconception, describes the Commission as "a tribunal charged with the protection of Catholic interests;" a designation totally inapplicable, and calculated to convey most erroneous impressions. A tribunal charged with such duties could not be made safe by the appointment of one Catholic to contend against six or seven Protestants. But, in truth, the Commission undertakes no duties of the kind.

The *Tablet* recapitulates categorically the reasons against coöperation with the Commission, as gathered by us from the mouths of opponents; but it passes with a light foot over the weighty arguments which we adduced in refutation. It does not attempt to show that a claim for the appointment of a Catholic commissioner was put forward in due time, or in connection with an acceptable name; nor does it explain how a conscientious Catholic could as commissioner, have promoted the general objects of the Commission. For individual Catholics to assist the Commission with authentic information regarding Catholic education and Catholic wants, in the hope of promoting thereby the interests of religion, is a different thing indeed from a Catholic serving upon a Commission which—unless it recommend the infinitely worse alternative of mixed schools—will have to devise means for furthering the education of the children of Protestants, Unitarians, and Jews, in the creed of their parents. Our own opinion is, that a Catholic so placed would be in a false position; and we rejoice accordingly that the respected chairman of the *Poor-School Committee* has escaped the snare. But, argues the *Tablet*, the absence of a Catholic commissioner makes the

Commission an unfair and improper tribunal to protect Catholic interests, because unable from ignorance, even if willing, to elicit the requisite information, or to appreciate it duly when it had to draw up its report. What idea, we should like to know, has the *Tablet* formed of Catholic primary education? Are Catholic poor-schools conceived to be so wholly unlike other schools that children do not learn to read, and write, and cipher in them? or that habits of regularity and order are not enforced? or that vice is not checked and virtue encouraged under the sanctions of religion? "To discharge our important duty to the children of the poor," wrote the Vicars-Apostolic in appointing the *Poor-School Committee*, "it is not enough for us to remove the dangers of perversion from these little ones, and to guard them against every insidious snare; we are furthermore obliged to use our best endeavours that their minds may be improved, and their hearts may be formed. It is one of our most sacred and important duties to see that these little ones be well instructed in all the principles of our holy religion, in all that regards the faith and morality of the Gospel; that their several duties be strongly impressed and engraved upon their tender hearts; that they be distinctly taught the obedience they owe to God, to their parents, and to their sovereign; and, together with a warm attachment to their holy religion, that they be inspired with a horror of vice and a love of virtue." Such are the objects of Catholic primary education. Are they not precisely those which the Commissioners are likely to appreciate, and to wish to find promoted in good schools? Certainly there is a class of virtues inculcated in Catholic schools which the Commissioners will not find elsewhere, and are not likely to estimate at their real value. If, however, Catholic schools are allowed—and this, we believe, would be the result of the Commissioners' investigations—to accomplish in the natural order at least as much as any Protestant schools can effect for the like class of children, we need not be solicitous to extend their view to virtues of the supernatural order, which are as far above the Commissioners' ken as they are beyond the limits of their inquiry. Catholic education does all that Protestant education can do, and more. Let us for the present be satisfied to prove to the world that it does as much. By refusing to show what we do, we shall but confirm the belief that we accomplish nothing which is creditable.

No effort is made in the *Tablet* to correct the figures which we quoted from the census of 1851, or to dispute the conclusion that the educational work of Catholics gives us

no right to demand one representative in a commission of seven. We shall not weary our readers with further figures: those who desire later evidence upon the comparative progress of Catholic and Protestant schools may consult the *Miscellaneous Statistics of the United Kingdom for 1853, 1854, and 1855*, recently published in a blue-book, which shows the Catholic advance to be less extensive than we had hoped. Facts and figures make, no doubt, a miserable line when contrasted with the bright path of a fanciful imagination. But, after all, is it not safer and more Christian-like to form a sober estimate of ourselves and our deeds, and to moderate our pretensions accordingly?

With regard to the scope of the Commission, it seems to be necessary for us to reassert that the inquiry extends to religion only so far as to ascertain whether religious formularies are, as a fact, taught or not, and whether intelligibly or not. It embraces no expression of opinion on the particular formularies or on any subjects of controversy. To talk of the Commission sitting in judgment on our religion is mere folly. Without this limited inquiry into the fact of religious teaching, the Commission would certainly tend towards the disastrous adoption of a state-supported system of mixed schools. By refusing to satisfy the inquiry, Catholics may create a suspicion that the Catechism is not invariably taught in our schools, or that we are ashamed to acknowledge the doctrines of the Catechism in the face of our countrymen; but they cannot add to the dignity or security of religion.

The *Tablet* alludes to the obstinate battle which we fought with Government, foregoing all money-aid until a principle was recognised; and assumes that the matter then in dispute was whether Catholic schools receiving grants from the Privy Council should be visited by Protestant inspectors. Nothing could be more inexact. We have refreshed our memory by reference to the correspondence of 1847 between Lord John Russell and the *Catholic Institute*, and we find that the first draft of the Minute of Council for the recognition of Catholic schools provides that the inspector shall not be nominated without his name having been previously submitted to the Institute. As soon as ever Government, at the instigation of Sir Robert Peel and other liberal statesmen, had resolved to do an act of tardy justice in admitting Catholic schools to share with others in the parliamentary grants, at once the rule relating to inspection which had been conceded to other religious bodies was offered to the Catholic authorities. The rule is not that inspectors must be of the same religion as the schools they visit, for, as a matter of fact, the

greater number of inspectors of dissenting schools belong to the Established Church ; but it is, that the name of the gentleman proposed for appointment shall be communicated to the representatives of the schools in which he is to be employed. Years before the general admission a Catholic school in Sheffield had by private influence obtained a government building-grant, and until 1849 that school was inspected and reported on by the late Mr. Fletcher, the inspector of dissenting schools, without any obstinate battle or foregoing of money-aid. It was on a wholly different question of school-management, and subsequent to the settlement of the Catholic Minute, and to the appointment of a Catholic inspector under it, that the obstinate battle was fought,—at a time when Catholic schools were freely receiving all kinds of money-aid excepting grants for the erection of buildings. Yet though the principle of inspection by approved inspectors, established for others, was conceded to us without a battle, still we never proposed to surrender it, or any other advantage laboriously acquired in years of patient toil. It is precisely because we desire to retain these advantages, that we deprecate the suicidal policy of hostility to the Commission. The commissioners are not inspectors. The inspector's work is confined to the interior of particular schools ; he visits only in reference to public money paid or payable ; he annually examines certain persons in the schools, and recommends or withholds the allowance of stipends. The commissioner's survey extends to all children, inside and outside, of all schools ; he embraces every educational institute, aided or unaided, public or private ; he has no concern with grants of money ; he examines no one for payment of stipend ; he comes once, and is seen no more. The functions of the two are as different as their origin. The denominational principle could not be adopted by a commission charged to take a general impartial survey of all kinds and classes of educational work, and to devise measures for remedying omissions ; and the demand of the *Tablet* amounts in reality to a claim for a commission exclusively Catholic.

The *Tablet* compares the case of the Commission with that of the army chaplains. With how slight justice ! The British army, raised by voluntary enlistment, is composed of Catholic soldiers to the extent of one-third of its whole fighting force. Catholic chaplains, when appointed for the spiritual oversight of Catholic soldiers, had an unquestionable right to equal rank and pay with the Protestant chaplains ; and though some might regret that a merely pecuniary claim should be pressed upon Government in preference to the more serious

interests of prisoners and inmates of unions, still the claim was just, and could not long be resisted. What analogy does the case bear to the Education Commission? None whatever; unless, indeed, it had been proposed, in case Government declined to raise their pay, that the Catholic chaplains should be withdrawn from the army,—in which fatal course there might perhaps have been found some resemblance to the policy recommended in the case of the Commission; or unless it be that the recent royal warrant, in awarding pensions to the widows of chaplains, inflicts upon Catholic chaplains, who can leave no widows, a wrong similar to that done to Catholic schools by the omission of Mr. Langdale's name from the Royal Commission on Education.

In doubtful questions, unanimity is best secured by discussion. Thoughtful Catholics ask not for victory, but for conviction. Concealed discontents injure more than avowed difference of opinion. The danger to be now repelled, the advantage to be secured, the encroachment to be resisted, and the good bargain to be driven, if they exist, may be explained; and Catholic action will not become less intelligent and effective when it ceases to be exerted blindfold.

It is said, the question is already concluded. We hope not. The Government, which cannot be thought friendly, may be well content to see us destroy our own interests without resorting to any of the ready expedients which would necessitate a change in tactics. Representations through its diplomatic agent in Rome, the substitution of a parliamentary committee with power to call witnesses, or an act authorising the Commission to require what now it simply asks,—such are the most obvious means which lie before the Government; and we cannot escape these measures by forgetting their possibility. Probably, however, we shall be left alone. Our threatened course is well known to be self-destructive; and we shall be allowed to take it without hindrance, while the Established Church and the Dissenters profit by our ruin. In warning against this catastrophe, we have raised a voice which we feel to be neither timid nor servile nor corrupt.

"We clearly see, and deeply lament," wrote the Bishops in 1848, "the very general and most pressing want of a religious education for the children of the poor; and with our united voice we now proclaim to you, with all the earnestness of our souls, that on the success of this our common effort in behalf of the children of the poor, not only our religious progress and prosperity, but also the eternal salvation of thousands, does depend." The very same interests are now at stake. Are they to be abandoned under the influence of imaginary

greater number of inspectors of dissenting schools belong to the Established Church ; but it is, that the name of the gentleman proposed for appointment shall be communicated to the representatives of the schools in which he is to be employed. Years before the general admission a Catholic school in Sheffield had by private influence obtained a government building-grant, and until 1849 that school was inspected and reported on by the late Mr. Fletcher, the inspector of dissenting schools, without any obstinate battle or foregoing of money-aid. It was on a wholly different question of school-management, and subsequent to the settlement of the Catholic Minute, and to the appointment of a Catholic inspector under it, that the obstinate battle was fought,—at a time when Catholic schools were freely receiving all kinds of money-aid excepting grants for the erection of buildings. Yet though the principle of inspection by approved inspectors, established for others, was conceded to us without a battle, still we never proposed to surrender it, or any other advantage laboriously acquired in years of patient toil. It is precisely because we desire to retain these advantages, that we deprecate the suicidal policy of hostility to the Commission. The commissioners are not inspectors. The inspector's work is confined to the interior of particular schools ; he visits only in reference to public money paid or payable ; he annually examines certain persons in the schools, and recommends or withholds the allowance of stipends. The commissioner's survey extends to all children, inside and outside, of all schools ; he embraces every educational institute, aided or unaided, public or private ; he has no concern with grants of money ; he examines no one for payment of stipend ; he comes once, and is seen no more. The functions of the two are as different as their origin. The denominational principle could not be adopted by a commission charged to take a general impartial survey of all kinds and classes of educational work, and to devise measures for remedying omissions ; and the demand of the *Tablet* amounts in reality to a claim for a commission exclusively Catholic.

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interests of prisoners and inmates of unions, still the claim was just, and could not long be resisted. What analogy does the case bear to the Education Commission? None whatever; unless, indeed, it had been proposed, in case Government declined to raise their pay, that the Catholic chaplains should be withdrawn from the army,—in which fatal course there might perhaps have been found some resemblance to the policy recommended in the case of the Commission; or unless it be that the recent royal warrant, in awarding pensions to the widows of chaplains, inflicts upon Catholic chaplains, who can leave no widows, a wrong similar to that done to Catholic schools by the omission of Mr. Langdale's name from the Royal Commission on Education.

In doubtful questions, unanimity is best secured by discussion. Thoughtful Catholics ask not for victory, but for conviction. Concealed discontents injure more than avowed difference of opinion. The danger to be now repelled, the advantage to be secured, the encroachment to be resisted, and the good bargain to be driven, if they exist, may be explained; and Catholic action will not become less intelligent and effective when it ceases to be exerted blindfold.

It is said, the question is already concluded. We hope not. The Government, which cannot be thought friendly, may be well content to see us destroy our own interests without resorting to any of the ready expedients which would necessitate a change in tactics. Representations through its diplomatic agent in Rome, the substitution of a parliamentary committee with power to call witnesses, or an act authorising the Commission to require what now it simply asks,—such are the most obvious means which lie before the Government; and we cannot escape these measures by forgetting their possibility. Probably, however, we shall be left alone. Our threatened course is well known to be self-destructive; and we shall be allowed to take it without hindrance, while the Established Church and the Dissenters profit by our ruin. In warning against this catastrophe, we have raised a voice which we feel to be neither timid nor servile nor corrupt.

"We clearly see, and deeply lament," wrote the Bishops in 1848, "the very general and most pressing want of a religious education for the children of the poor; and with our united voice we now proclaim to you, with all the earnestness of our souls, that on the success of this our common effort in behalf of the children of the poor, not only our religious progress and prosperity, but also the eternal salvation of thousands, does depend." The very same interests are now at stake. Are they to be abandoned under the influence of imaginary

terrors? or shall they not rather be boldly sustained and vigorously promoted? Providence has placed the means of success in our hands; is it wisdom to cast them away?

NOTE. It may be worth while to notice, that a somewhat similar educational controversy is going on in the United States. The Bishops have recommended the foundation of parochial schools, in opposition to the secular governmental schools, in all Catholic districts. The purport of this injunction has given rise to a very interesting controversy, which is ably summed up in one of the "Conversations of our Club" in *Brownson's Review* for October last. Dr. Brownson's conclusion seems to be, that "it is not possible to establish Catholic schools, supported by Catholics with their limited means, that shall successfully compete with the common schools supported by a public tax, or by public funds, and at the same time build churches, and provide for the services of religion. They cannot build first-class school-houses for all their children, nor afford to pay the salaries which will command the services of first-class teachers. In most places the pastor is poor, and struggling with debt; and if he attempts to establish a first-class school, he involves himself still deeper in debt, is still more embarrassed to find the ways and means of meeting his expenses.

"I do not understand [our Bishops] to require the clergy to establish schools where they are impracticable, or where the pastor and people are unable to do it without great inconvenience, or where they cannot establish a school *every way equal to the public schools*."* We recommend to our readers the perusal of the whole article, where they will see a picture of the state to which English Catholic primary schools will probably be reduced if a general system of secular education is introduced, and Government aid withdrawn from all denominational schools. Even the *Tablet* might find itself, with Dr. Brownson, reduced to comfort itself in the adversity by rejoicing that the sects had suffered more than we had, and that though "in an old Catholic country the secularisation of education opens the door to infidelity, in a non-Catholic country it favours religion by breaking down sectarianism and the bigotry and intolerance of the community;"†—by the complacent question, "How much better off under a moral and religious point of view are your children who run at large in the streets, associate with the vilest and most criminal portion of the depraved population, and

* *Brownson's Review*, Oct. 1858, p. 443.

† *Ibid.* p. 429.

who grow up to be food for your houses of correction, penitentiaries, prisons, and gallows,—how much better off, even under a Catholic point of view, are these than they who attend the public schools, and in them acquire at least habits of order and study, and the rudiments of a solid secular education!—*—or by considering that not much harm accrues to the child from being compelled to read the Protestant version of the Bible,†—not so much harm perhaps as from being placed under half-educated, half-paid teachers, whose manners and influence can do little to elevate and refine them, so that there will perhaps be more difficulty in preserving to the faith the children educated in such schools than those educated in the public schools of the country.‡ It is to preserve us from this consummation, by adding what little weight we possess to the good scale, that we again respectfully and earnestly implore our authorities to weigh the arguments we have advanced, and to reconsider the determination which the newspapers assume they have come to. English Catholics, by universal consent, enjoy the best and freest system of primary education known to Christendom. Bishops and clergy and laity have toiled to frame and consolidate it; surely it should not now be sacrificed without necessity.

BUREAUCRACY.

It may seem strange to some of our readers, that while we profess great hostility to bureaucracy, or the interference of a centralised government in matters of family and individual life, we should at the same time take up the cudgels in favour of a governmental inquiry into our education which will probably result in such an interference.

And here, most certainly, if we thought we could do without Government altogether, we should infinitely prefer doing so; but all our most sensible heads have come to the conclusion that this is impossible, both on account of our poverty and weakness, and because of the power and intention of Government. The problem, therefore, is, to make the best terms we can; and our advocacy of coöperation with the Commission is grounded entirely on this consideration.

For we consider that any generalised system of education is of dangerous tendency; that it leans towards the bureau-

* Brownson's Review, Oct. 1858, p. 431. † Ibid. p. 440. ‡ Ibid. p. 442.

cracy which we so much fear, and encourages bureaucratic principles both in teachers and in the taught. Bureaucracy resides in faculties, not in classes. There could not be a bureaucracy of mere farmers, or landed proprietors, or merchants; similarity of employment is not enough; nor are organisation, mutual dependence, and mutual intelligence sufficient. A military government is not a bureaucracy. The men of a bureaucracy must have sufficient literary and scientific culture to enable them to set up as critics and guides of life, and therefore fit to direct the life of the nation. Bureaucracy is nothing factitious, nothing imposed from without; it is a natural growth, produced by the creation and organisation of a mass of educated *employés*. It is the expression of their social life.

In all governments there may be odious tyranny, monopolies, exactions, and abominable abuses of nearly all kinds; but the idea of a bureaucracy is not fulfilled till we add the pedantic element of a pretence to direct our life, to know what is best for us, to measure out our labour, to superintend our studies, to prescribe our opinions, to make itself answerable for us, to put us to bed, tuck us up, put on our night-cap, and administer our gruel. This element does not seem possible without a persuasion on the part of the governing power that it is in possession of the secret of life, that it has a true knowledge of the all-embracing political science, which should direct the conduct of all men, or at least of all citizens. Hence any government that avowedly sets before its eyes the *summum-bonum* of humanity, defines it, and directs all its efforts to this end, tends to become a bureaucracy.

The world has seen many realisations of, and more attempts to realise, all kinds of bureaucracies; the bureaucracy of lawyers, of divines, of physiologists, of political economists, of schoolmasters, of philosophers, of paternal administrators, —all of whom have had their special *nostrum*, their *panacea*, for ailing humanity, which they have felt called to compel humanity, list or loth, to swallow.

The bureaucracy of lawyers is the universal pattern of all. Law, according to the Greek, Roman, and revived-classical definition, extends to every action of man: the legal rights of legislators attach to every possible act; whatever the subject does may be questioned; they may abuse, but can never exceed, their power. The authority of government is unlimited, so far as there are no express boundaries to it. "Whatever the law does not command, it forbids," says Aristotle; and "the laws speak on all possible subjects."* Again,

* Eth. v. 11 and 2.

"The law should govern all things."* So far was this principle carried, that a society where the law was not thus developed was not thought to deserve the name of a polity. England would have been thought barbarous, unstatesmanlike, unscientific, in considering all actions lawful, and the liberty of the subject unbounded, till a law can be produced that forbids them. In Greece and Rome the law was first, and the man had to prove his right. In England the man is first, and the burden of proof of illegality in his actions is thrown on the law; there is no *droit administratif*, no power whatever belongs to the government, as such, except what the law gives it; there is no personification of the state, no sacrifice of the solid constituent to the ideal whole. England has no XII. Tables to declare the *salus populi suprema lex*, but clings to the mediæval and Christian principle, *jus cujusque suprema lex*; the supreme law is founded on the rights of individuals, not on the supposed expediency of the state.

But the civil law takes the entire man under its tutelage, and sets itself up as the mundane providence. And lawyers, imbued with its spirit, are the very incarnations of bureaucracy. Never was this exhibited more clearly than in the Convention of French pettifoggers, where Robespierre declared, "We will have an order of things where all base and cruel passions are chained up, and all beneficial and generous passions aroused, *by the laws*;" and where St. Just pretended to change, by a violent dose of legislation, the morals and manners of a nation, and to reform the human heart.

Happily free from this aggravated plague of lawyers, England has suffered much from the bureaucracy of divines: as in the religious espionage established by the penal laws; in the Puritan pretence to identify Church and State, to deduce their State-Church rules from Scripture only, and to abolish canon, civil, chancery, and common law and law-courts in favour of their elder-discipline and scriptural courts of conscience,—a pretence carried out with inquisitorial espionage, and the gravest attention of the heaviest divines even to the lightest *minutiæ* of female ornament and male amusement; and in the caliphate of Charles I., with his viziers Laud and Juxon and Spotswood, their courts of High Commission and Star-Chamber, and their hundreds of governmental acts, motivated solely by the desire to fix each man passively in his proper place, and to maintain in each the sense that he was under the paternal charge of persons who could judge better than himself what he should eat, drink, and avoid.

But this is rather the physiological bureaucracy, such as

* Politics, iv. 6.

Bacon dreamed of in his *New Atlantis*. Suffice it to say, that the great characteristic of true bureaucracy is the intimate conviction of its conductors that the provisions made by them adequately cover the whole area of human life and thought, or at least the most important parts of it; therefore that all other provisions are superfluous, and, if contrary to their ideas, noxious, and as such, to be done away with as soon as possible, so as to leave a clear field for the regenerating action of their beneficent influence. Hence the intolerant, monopolising, intrusive character of all true bureaucracy, and its distinction from the vulgar inartificial military tyranny, or the rule of the policeman. These only look at first to the outside of things, to overt acts; bureaucracy, when fully developed, searches the hearts and thoughts by its secret police. But take the soldier or the policeman, educate him to look after our morals, to report upon our opinions, and to interfere with our family arrangements, and you soon teach him to be a bureaucrat. There is no bureaucracy in the rough-and-ready expedients of the press-gang, or in the recruiting-sergeant wheedling the drunken ploughboy to receive the Queen's shilling. But when all the population is kept on the registers, their employments and acquirements noted, their bodily capabilities marked, and themselves subjected at intervals to the machinery of the conscription, then we begin to perceive the presence of a bureaucratic agency, mixing itself up with the family, and directing the national life.

But this agency does not become very intolerable till it is further developed, and begins to meddle with locomotion, communication, association, opinion, and faith. It then becomes a kind of tutorship or pedantry, applicable to little boys, but applied to grown men and women. Its whole type is pedagogic; its symbol is the schoolmaster: not, indeed, the schoolmaster of old days, when the birch became the refuge of decayed butlers, seedy bankrupts, out-at-elbows ne'er-do-wells who had failed in every other occupation, and lazy loungers who had not credit to command capital for any higher venture,—in a mass of such materials there was neither organisation, nor ambition, nor restlessness, and therefore no germs of bureaucracy.

But this type of schoolmaster is rapidly disappearing under the government influence; considered both internally and externally, the "preceptor's" life is now a different thing from what it was. Taken by itself, the vocation of a teacher has three elements: grandeur of trust,—to form a budding intellect and to direct opening habits; irksomeness of operation, in its wearisome repetitions, contradictions of impudent

pupils, annoyances, and disappointments; and pettiness of material to be worked with—the infantine mind, not in its amiable manifestations, but in a routine as distasteful to itself as to the teacher,—alphabets, rudiments, simple ideas and words, elementary arithmetic, and other things as uninteresting to the most ordinary as to the more extraordinary mind. Then, with regard to its external position, the triviality of the necessary acquirements keeps the scholastic market abundantly if not well supplied, and depresses the market-value even of the better class of teachers. All these things tended to keep down the average acquirements of primary schoolmasters; or to confine the profession to a class of men who, if not fit for that work, were at any rate fit for nothing else. There is a contradiction in the requisite elements of character: the religious grandeur of the trust requires an enlarged or religious soul to appreciate it: on the other hand, an enlarged mind is but too apt to be utterly disgusted both with the irksome wearisome treadmill of labour and with the petty details of alphabets, spelling-lessons, and addition; and a mind that could easily allow itself to be absorbed in these matters is hardly likely to take an intelligent view of the grandeur of its vocation. Hence the good schoolmaster was usually a dull fellow of high principle, who worked hard because it was his duty, and was able to stick to his work because he had not wit to feel the tedium of the eternal round of routine he was doomed to tread; while the bad schoolmaster was often the seedy fellow we have described above, entering the profession without a conscience, without a thought of the ideal grandeur of the calling, driven by the necessity of seeking food and shelter, and invited by the easy elementary character of the small stock-in-trade requisite to begin business.

But the days of this jog-trot system were numbered when Government began to provide schools, and to pay teachers according to the results of a competitive examination. Such examination only proves the sharpness or power of masters, not their patience or will to economise those powers. But for a model primary master, patience rather than sharpness is the first requisite. The primary master loses his pupils as soon as they get beyond the rudiments, and has to begin again with a fresh batch. His chances of having a legitimate opportunity to display his flashy acquirements are but small; in a short time he is wearied out, bored to death, and loses patience: then he begins to test new theories and try new schemes, unless he makes up for his wearisome mental drudgery by passionate indulgence; at least he rejects the idea of giving

up his life to this distasteful discipline; he looks forward to emancipation, or to raising himself, if not in his profession, at least through his profession; he enters into combination with others of the class, with whom he agitates theories and schemes; he becomes more and more alienated from the plain dry duty of instructing a rapid succession of children in the same rudiments; he begins to dislike this almost ecclesiastical calling, which constitutes the ascetic life of so many devoted religious persons, and attaches himself more and more to the government which awakened his intellectual ambition by its competitive examinations, and which holds the purse on which he chiefly depends: then he begins to regard himself as a member of the class of functionaries,—as a government *employé*, and to despise all authority but that which holds out prizes to his ambition. Here, then, is an organisation, wide-spreading, influential, pedantic; a ready tool of government interference, if any Ledru Rollin should arise who wants to use it.

And the boys formed on the competitive principle constitute another element of danger in the same direction. The master is naturally anxious to present a creditable school to the inspector: he has done all he can to sharpen his pupils, and to fill them with a kind of literary enthusiasm; and the boys have got the smattering of an education that makes them discontented with unintellectual labour, and holds out to them hopes of clerkly employment. The bricklayer's son, who has learned Latin and the use of the globes, despises the handicraft of his father, and determines not to be an artisan: he seeks a place,—clerk, shopboy, railway officer, policeman, postman,—something “literary,” or something under government, where his pen-proficiency and book-learning may be turned to some account. Then the influence of the competitive system itself substitutes ambition for respect and the amiable feelings which made the master a kind of father to his boys, and leads the pupils to value their acquirements, not for any substantial excellence of their own, but for the power they confer of triumphing over others, and raising themselves above their original level. Moreover the special subjects in which the competition takes place are subjects of no intrinsic market-value in themselves, productive neither of food nor raiment, but simply preparations to aid the mind in the future business of life. But these mental preparations have hitherto in school been treated as the substantial business of life; and there is a life where they are the substantial business, namely, the life of the bureau. Competitive education, therefore, is gradually forming a large class of young

men whose interest it would be to remodel society on a bureaucratic basis, and to multiply offices, so that they might be able to gain their living by what they had learned at school.

Now in a country like ours, where one power in the constitution is the democratic element, the spread of intelligence among the people must continually bring more and more of them within the number of those in whom the exercise of political power is vested. And the mere multiplication of the constituents of a state is a step towards bureaucracy; it almost necessitates both the multiplication of *employés* and the increase of their power to pry into the actions of every citizen. For instance, when the French Revolution gave the right of universal suffrage, it was of course necessary to take care that the same man should not fraudulently vote several times at the same or different urns. Hence every elector—every male adult—had to be furnished with a kind of passport and ticket of identification, in which the police had to certify all changes of domicile, and at last all locomotion. The man was described in the paper he carried, and he was liable to be challenged to produce it at any time or place. Here is the abominable passport system following as a logical result from universal suffrage and the ballot; and bureaucracy is proved to be as natural an attendant on the multiplication and intensifying of the democratic element of society as on autocracy. And when this numerous class of *employés* consists of young men taught in the competitive schools, they must be of the type which such schools are calculated to turn out. A crammed knowledge, a smattering of all sciences, is no store to be depended upon: its real result is a conceited ignorance, a sharpening of the common logical powers of the mind, adapting it for that commonest of all logical processes, the development of principles to their farthest results, but leaving it quite unfurnished for the real business of reason,—weighing probabilities, allowing for the interference of contrary principles, and appreciating all facts on which induction is to be founded. The young, ardent, unfurnished mind insists on *à-priori* principles. The *rights of man* on the one side, the *divine right of kings* on the other, divide unformed intellects between them; older heads, older either in years or in judgment, soon see the utter futility of the attempt to apply mathematical and metaphysical methods to the practical questions of morals and politics. But unhappily the *à-priori* method has great charms: its unfaltering infallibility, its confident universality, its entire contempt for all gainsayers, and the facility of its arrangement, all capti-

vate the young student. It is at the level of his powers: for logic requires but little external aid; it is internal; its principles are innate; it is as perfect in youth as in age,—soon learned, easily used: given a prolific general principle, and, like the Tyrian cow's hide, logic soon cuts it up into strips enough to surround a city. But learning, that cautious hesitating desire to be right and fear of being wrong which tests the validity of each step by examples and experiments, is long, difficult, and disagreeable; it is recommended to the youthful student by no charms,—it bears on its face the impress of dull prosaic labour.

Yet it is the characteristic of all great statesmen. Selden avers that he and his assistants left not a document unturned in concocting the Declaration of Rights. Burke, in spite of his vast philosophical powers, and the ease and brilliancy with which he argues on general principles, is the great prophet of prosaic politics. All really great statesmen and lawyers are characterised by such a love of facts, by such a careful weighing of authorities, by such special pleading, that they seem to be cynically indifferent to the logical development of principles, to oratory, to philosophy, to the grandest and most admirable bursts of nature and feeling. In the sphere of law and politics, the man of cool judgment and informed reason snuffs out all such flourishes, pooh-poohs the rhetorician, and respects facts alone.

And this consideration will enable us to appreciate at its just value the praise which is claimed by Frenchmen, and allowed them by all fair minds. "We are logical," they say; "we carry out principles to their full development, and sacrifice facts to reason; we are preëminently rational:" whereas "the English are more practical, but less reasonable; they do not think, or carry out their principles; they are in a perpetual hesitation as to rational systems, and never come to any simple unmixed conclusion; fortune favours them, but their minds are of an inferior order." We may note the French characteristic in the Irish mind. Without forgetting that the Irish Burke stands at the very head of the representatives of the English spirit, we cannot conceal from ourselves that much the same spirit rules in Ireland as in France, and with the same political results. One nation as much as the other is led to personify government, to look up to it as a personal ruler, animated with its own reason and will, and acting from its own feelings and impulses, and to expect it to guide, direct, and govern every thing. Instead of regarding it as a temporary committee,—a kind of national vestry, elected to carry on the national business for a time in accord-

ance with the national feeling, till a change in the public temper shall substitute another set of men to represent another policy,—they consider government as a providence, omnipotent, and therefore answerable for every ill. As government is the great master of the supplies, they covet nothing so much as a place under it. The national ambition is to be an *employé*: without considering how the state is to go on if all are employed by it, all press into its service, and expect it to support them. They reason out logically the first and simplest idea of government; they do not return upon the notion, analyse it, and modify their feelings in respect to it. This it is to be logical; this it is to be half-educated in a great national system of shallow and showy learning,—to have sharpened intellects without practised judgments; this it is to be qualified almost naturally for journalists, for brilliant one-sided essayists, for special correspondents, for reporters, for penny-a-liners, for almost all the secondary employments of literature: but not to be fitted for a great imperial view of things, for command, for combination, for justice, for the highest walks in philosophy, till the defect has been eradicated by real labour and long and patient thought. The boasted superiority of our intellectual neighbours is really an inferiority, because the practical education of the illiterate Englishman is in its results much nearer to the most developed learning than the half-finished literary culture of France, which only makes a man logical and consistent in taking the part for the whole, in wearing half-truths threadbare, and in seeing no limit to his own capacity. Not that such a way of viewing things is peculiar to the Frenchman; give the illiterate Englishman the French culture, and he will soon have the French ideas.

It is only among such a people that bureaucracy in its purest and intensest form is possible; when the mechanism of government is considered to be the end of all things,—the chief good of man; when man is a mere governable disposable animal, meant to be dealt with by the deep arcana of reports, orders, admonitions, and police regulations. The half-educated man never knows his ignorance; he thinks he knows all things; in other words, he makes the little he knows equivalent to all things.* Let this little be an acquaintance with the procedures of administration, and these

* Thus Selden, smarting under the Laudian bureaucracy, said: "Bishops are now unfit to govern *because of their learning*. They are bred up in another law; they run to the text for something done among the Jews that concerns not England. 'Tis just as if a man would have a kettle, and he would not go to our braziers to have it made as they make kettles; but he would have it made as Hiram made his brass-work, who wrought in Solomon's Temple."

procedures are sure to present themselves to his imagination as the grandest and most important things in the world. They will be his religion, and more than his religion: when his function supplies him also with food and raiment, then all the passions of interest are enlisted on its side, and administrators will club together for mutual protection and defence, and to exalt their function into the great prophetic and social institution of the world.

And people with this admiration of their functions are always the best functionaries; they go about their duties with a zest and religious fervour which ensures the most enthusiastic activity. Hence the bureaucratic spirit finds great favour with secretaries of state; they find their work facilitated and simplified by the zeal of their subordinates. The ease that it communicates to the wheels of politics is wonderful. Administrators know so well their own department, that the clumsy mechanism of our stupid old amateur vestrymen, overseers, justices, sheriffs, and legislators, has no chance of standing before it. Think of the power with which a poor-law commissioner comes down upon a pig-headed board of guardians that *will* give out-door relief instead of breaking up a poor body's home. He comes with the triple prestige of superior place, superior knowledge of the law, and perfect familiarity with the details of administrative practice. He comes down like an expert on a set of tyros, like a sailor on a lot of land-lubbers, like a traveller on a party of untravelled bumpkins. Every man is entitled to respect in matters of his own trade. The division of departments has enabled our commissioner to gather up into his own hands all the ribbons of every subdivision of his subject; he knows its statistics by heart; he soon comes to an understanding with the clerk of the board, or some other paid and permanent official, and with a very little dexterity manages to make matters go as he wishes. Nothing stands against him except every now and then the deep-read scientific knowledge of some retired philosopher, who besides taking a general view of all political departments, and reducing the commissioner's pretensions to their proper dimensions, is able to grapple with him on his own ground, and to maintain his argument even against the other's special preparation; then comes discussion and publicity, and an amendment of the obnoxious proceedings.

But as the state increases, and most in the classes that require to be administered, administration must increase likewise; the number of *employés* must wax greater and greater, they must be organised, and with their organisation the classification of the people whose affairs they have to

administer must keep pace. In each department a powerful fraternity will be gradually formed, to inquire, to register, to report: first of all merely about our powers of contributing to the taxes; then about our births, deaths, and marriages; soon we have them inquiring about our religion,—and we may be sure that what they inquire about they would meddle with if they dared—they do so whenever they dare. They inquire about a soldier's, or a pauper's, or a prisoner's religion, when he first enters the barrack, or the poor-house, or the prison. Is that man thenceforth really free to change his religion as he likes, with the freedom guaranteed to each subject by our constitution and our laws? or is he administered by the *employé*, who would compel him to keep as he is rather than take the trouble to alter the register? The poorer classes are already administered bureaucratically. The little end of the wedge is in, and a speculative systematic statesman may any day find occasion to drive it deeper.

It is a great mistake to suppose that a bureaucratic system is only possible where the government is monarchical; it can arise gradually under every form of policy, and it renders every form of government despotic. A man in authority is what he is, however he came there—by hereditary title, by the bayonets of his soldiers, or by universal suffrage; the road of his advancement is an accident, his position is the positive element, his essence is that he is a ruler. Whatever safeguards are necessary for any authorities, are necessary for all; we run no less risk from the aggrandised democrat than from the monarch or the aristocrat; it is the human nature of all of them equally to meddle, and to unite as much as possible the controlling with the executive power, so as to have no one who can interfere with their meddling. What can be clearer than that the controlling is the supreme power? what more logical than that the supreme power should actively assert its supremacy? A logical, that is, a half-learned people will therefore transfer the nominal power to the place where it really exists, and will cumulate the whole of it in the people or the monarch. Thus by bureaucracy people or monarch becomes equally despotic; it gives despotic power to whatever government it serves. The Swiss republics and the German and Sardinian constitutions are as despotic in their administration as the French empire, because in all the administration is bureaucratic.

Bureaucracy, when powerful, is essentially revolutionary, because it is logical; that is, because it proceeds on the literary development of general principles, not on the practical road of experiences and facts, and thence is led to introduce

radical changes inconsistent with the habits of the people for whom it legislates. In interests and in condition the functionaries form a class apart, whose business is to classify the rest in the way that gives itself least trouble, and at the same time to multiply its duties towards them so as to have more claim upon them for pay and an excuse for multiplying its numbers. It always keeps changing the people along arbitrary lines of an artificial classification, on arithmetical, not on human principles; it makes no account of the history and habits of the people—what should it know of habits and history? Its only aim is perpetually to discover new modes of interference, to provide more work for the bureau, and to subject the people ever more completely to its drill.

It is revolutionary towards the head of the government, because its power does not reside in any person, but in the system; the bureau, the complex body, is supreme, and goes on as well without a head as with one. The head depends on it, not it on the head; he falls, and another rises in his room; but whoever rises must use the organisation that is ready—he cannot govern without it, has no time to form a fresh system, and is obliged to adopt that which is at hand. The head, therefore, that manifests any symptoms of a hostile reforming tendency, has to fear the bureaucracy as his most deadly, most revolutionary enemy.

Now, how to guard against the insidious approaches of this vile system. First, we have to restrict as much as possible the sphere of the meddlesomeness of Government, and to keep our independence in as many departments of life as possible; never to consent that the Government should have a power over one class that we do not wish it to have over another. Never to applaud an unjust law against others, lest it be one day turned against us. To be patient under the necessary unreadiness and slowness of an independent system, where each part is balanced by checks; and to oppose steadily and consistently every great attempt at centralisation, such as an equalised poor-rate and a central administration of the duties of the boards of guardians, whatever benefits or conveniences may be promised to us in exchange. The class of functionaries must be kept low. For this cause we lament the competitive examination, as encouraging acquirements that find no legitimate outlet in the work to be performed, and providing us with a restless encroaching body of young pedants; whereas the old system left us in peace, with the knowledge that we had nothing to fear from the assured incapacity and unambitious content of those to whom the permanent routine duties of the state were committed. The functionaries should

always be kept subject to the public, and punished for every breach of courtesy or duty towards those whose business they have to administer. And in disputes the law should always *primâ facie* suppose the functionary to be in the wrong, or at least should hold the balance perfectly even. They must, of course, be responsible to their official superiors, but not in questions between them and the public: as soon as the public has no power of proceeding against the functionary except with his superior's consent, then the foundations of a real bureaucracy are laid. Again, all complaints, all actions against them, must be public; while the functionaries are not allowed to acquire the freemasonry of a secret society, they can never do much harm. Finally, we shall never be safe from bureaucracy till we have exorcised from our public men that *doctrinaire* spirit which reigns in revolutionists like Bentham, Buckle, and Bright,*—that positivism which treats man statistically and in the mass, not as individuals; arithmetically, not according to interests. The first result of formularisation is to abstract personality, as we showed in a review of Mr. Buckle last July. We must, then, be always suspicious of any school which treats men as so many ciphers to add up, subtract, divide, multiply, and reduce to vulgar fractions.

* We wonder that no one has noticed the absolute identity, not only in principles but even in whimsies, between Mr. Bright's Birmingham programme and the manifestos of the English revolutionary clubs in 1791, quoted by Burke in his "Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs." Those clubs taught "that though it is much talked about, no such thing as a constitution exists, or ever did exist; the people have a constitution yet to form; since William the Conqueror the country has never regenerated itself, and is therefore without a constitution: *where it cannot be produced in a visible form, there is none.* Every thing in the English government is the reverse of what it ought to be. . . . War is the common harvest of those who participate in the division and expenditure of public money. . . . Whether we view aristocracy before, or behind, or sideways, or any way else, domestically or publicly, it is still a monster; . . . the idea of an hereditary legislator is as absurd as an hereditary mathematician; . . . the law of primogeniture is against every law of nature, and nature itself calls for its destruction." The House of Commons was "mockery, insult, usurpation; not arising out of the inherent rights of the people, as the National Assembly does in France;"—and so on, exactly in the Bright line, often in his very words. Burke, next to Time, the great demolisher of this political theory, is therefore decried by our revolutionary writers as *mad*; up to 1790 Mr. Buckle owns that he was the greatest statesman England ever saw; from that time his immortal thoughts were but the outpourings of a maniac, his argument a methodised madness, his political principle an hallucination.

CÆSARISM, DIABOLISM, AND CHRISTIANITY.

To the Editor of the Rambler.

SIR,—There are three articles in your last Number, on different subjects, and apparently by different hands, but bearing so immediately upon one another, and upon a matter of such profound moment, that I crave your leave to offer a few thoughts on the principles those articles involve or refer to.

The author of the paper entitled “Political Thoughts on the Church” quotes a sentence from St. Augustine which, taken nakedly, contains the astounding proposition, “The fratricide was the first founder of the secular state.” Not having books at hand, I am unable to refer to the context, so as to see how far this piece of political Manichæism* is fairly to be attributed to the great saint and philosopher in whose work it occurs. But that the sentiment thus expressed is at this very moment the subtle cause of many of the chief difficulties of our times, I myself entertain but little doubt. The fruitless controversies, the bitter recriminations, the interminable misunderstandings, and the sufferings of the poor and helpless, which have practically resulted from a latent adoption of this theory,—which I may call “Diabolism,” or the belief in the diabolic origin of the temporal power,—are beyond calculation.

Among other inconveniences, more or less serious, springing from this frightful opinion, are to be reckoned the political and educational difficulties discussed in the two other articles to which I referred, namely, those on “The Education Commission,” and on “Toasting the Pope.” The connection of these difficulties with the diabolic theory of human society may not be very immediate, and in the one case the connection is perhaps less immediate than in the other; but that they both show signs of a common origin in the Manichæo-Calvinism of earlier and later ages, is, to my apprehension, sufficiently evident. The ramifications of this theory through the whole fabric of human thought and knowledge are, moreover, as extensive as that fabric itself; but it is not my purpose to trouble you with any remarks beyond their political and social bearings.

* Our correspondent would have to include others in his charge of Manichæism. Gerson says (Opp. ii. 253), “Civile dominium peccati occasione introductum.” Dante calls it “Remedium contra infirmitatem peccati.” It will not do to press the analogy too far; however erroneous, there is no more heresy in attributing a sinful origin to the state than to war.—*Ed. R.*

What, then, *is* the origin of the civil power and of social and domestic society, including the "family" itself? Is it from God, or from some power which is not God? On the answer to this question depends the attitude which every man who believes in God, and in Christianity as proceeding from God, must assume towards it. In other words, *as a matter of principle*, ought we to regard the temporal power, the framework of society and the system of the family, as the natural enemy of Christianity, or the reverse? Of course a state, or a society, or a family, which does not accept Christianity as true, is not a "friend" to Christianity in that sense of the word which is most diametrically opposed to the word "enemy." But is there no medium between deadly enmity and cordial affection? Is every man my foe who is not my brother? Shall I look to be cheated by every person who is not willing to share his fortune with me, or even to give me a good dinner and a splendid token of affection? Even supposing I am conscious of possessing great merits and lofty virtues, which are utterly overlooked by the crowd of my fellow-creatures, am I justified in considering them villains because Divine Providence has not thought fit to place them in a favourable position for estimating me at my real deserts?

The question, I need hardly say, is not as to what is, or may be, the actual conduct of the state in special cases; just as when I walk along the streets, and look at my fellow-creatures, the question is not as to the probability that many of those I meet would cheat me or depreciate me if I came into hostile contact with them. The question is, What is the state by divine institution? How are we to conduct ourselves towards the state as such? Was it set up by the Creator of all things for a good end, and with definite and never-ceasing purposes, and with corresponding rights and duties, as such? Has it a real, true, and God-designed function to fulfil, in its own order, and on a basis which, if not as extensive as that on which the structure of Christian duty rests, is yet, as far as it reaches, positive, solid, and trustworthy? Or, on the other hand, is the natural world, the immeasurable universe, the fabric of society, the intercourse between man and man, nay, the very relationship of parent and child,*—is all this the instrument of some evil principle, the declared enemy of the one true God; and therefore to be renounced, cast out, ab-

* Those who ascribe a sinful origin to the state, need not do the same for the family, because they do not include domestic in civil society; the fourth commandment and the sacrament of matrimony give the family a place in the religious department. The great battle of the Church in France is to preserve the family from socialistic pollution.—*Ed. R.*

horred, and resisted on every occasion and in every possible form and guise, by every man who believes in God with a practical faith, and loves Him with a love of preference?

Or, again, shall we, who believe in God, believe also in Epicureanism? Can we entertain the theory, monstrous alike in physics and in morals, that the Eternal Creator having made the universe, and stamped upon it the impress of His own glorious and incommunicable perfections, as it were shot it out from Himself,—if I may use so strange an expression,—and left it to work its way and fulfil its destiny, moral, intellectual, and material, apart from Himself, without being sustained by His hand, without being controlled by His providence, and without incessant reference to His will as a standard of duty? Is “Nature,” after all, something more than a phrase by which we express one portion of the works of God? What do we mean,—what does every man who practically believes in God mean, when he speaks of the laws of nature, of natural religion, of natural society, of natural duties, and natural feelings? Does he mean that all these are not directly from God? that they exist by themselves, though once, ages ago, they drew their being from God? Does he mean that *in themselves* they tend to draw me away from God, from my knowledge of Him, from my duties to Him, from my allegiance to the revelations He has subsequently made of His will?

It is my duty to obey the laws of the land. Why? Because I am a Christian? Undoubtedly so; but also because I am a man. It is my duty to observe the moral law towards my fellow-creatures every where, and whoever they may be. And why? Because the Gospel commands it; but also because it was the duty of all men to do this before the Gospel was given, and, what is the same thing, where the Gospel is not known. Because I have learnt from Christianity that which I could not know apart from Christianity, am I therefore absolved from those duties which existed prior to Christianity? Are the works of God inconsistent? Do they contradict one another? Are they designed to destroy each other? Are the original institutions of society become evil, or have they lost their pristine God-appointed rights, because the Christian institution has arisen from the very same source whence they first sprung?*

* “En tout ce qui n’a pas le mal pour principe, Dieu n’exclut rien, ne sacrifie rien: pas la plus petite vertu à la plus haute, pas la plus petite vérité à la plus grande.” *Madame Swetchine*. There could be no conflict between political and religious obligations before Christianity separated the two orders; the fathers could not fully understand the political consequences of Christianity, which it was the business of the middle ages to evolve; Calvin and Machiavelli brought

What amazing inconsistencies, indeed, do we sometimes hear from persons over whose minds this Manichæo-Calvinism has shed its baneful influence! How foolishly they seek to exalt Christianity by depreciating the earlier works of the God of Christianity! I have known men whose sole idea of every thing that is not contained in the printed English Bible was that it was so much soul-ensnaring folly. As if God was a kind of bungling workman, who did not understand the working of the machinery He Himself had fabricated; or as if He had designedly surrounded us with ten thousand means for knowledge, every one of which was deceptive and not enlightening.

It appears, then, sir, to me, that no slight portion of our practical difficulties in social, controversial, and educational questions results from our overlooking the divine origin of natural order, morals, and knowledge, on account of the evils which have been the fruit of their corrupted use. Yet because kings are sometimes tyrants, and persecute Catholicism, that is no more reason for believing that the temporal power is *in principle* opposed to revelation than Spurgeonism is a disproof of the genuineness of St. Paul's Epistles. There are abundance of sham philosophers, who deride the Gospel, and while they devote themselves to the study of the solar system, regard the resurrection of Jesus Christ as a fable; but does this really prove that the study of astronomy is a bad thing? Does it convert King David and St. Paul into preachers of nonsense, when they found in the physical universe the materials for a knowledge of God, and of our natural duty to Him as our God? Because Miss Martineau conceives that the choice between good and evil is a mere function of the *cerebrum*, and nothing more, shall I therefore cease to watch the flower that I daily see expanding before my eyes, discerning in it a direct act of Omnipotence manifesting Itself immediately to me, and calling for my adoration and love in accents which I cannot disregard?

Is it not certain, again, that in cases where we *may* encounter hostility both from bodies and from individuals, in very many instances we create that very hostility by assuming the certainty of its existence? Few men can go through life without noting the extraordinary differences which exist between the powers of different people in making friends, and in smoothing the difficulties which beset their path. In some there seems to exist a power for friendlessness quite astonish-

back the old confusion between the religious and political orders, one led astray by the Jews to overlook the political, the other by the Gentiles to overlook the spiritual.—*Ed. R.*

ing. They fail in their undertakings from sheer inability to "get on" with any body. With others it is the very reverse. Throw them down as strangers in any place, and in a few days they are strangers no longer. They get every body's good word. They find practical help where no man before them ever found any thing better than distant civility; from every brier they pluck a rose, from every blade of grass an ear of corn. Nor is this success to be put down to their oiliness, or flunkyism, or craft, or absence of fixed principles. On the contrary, your smooth-faced flatterer is rarely a permanently successful man. It is not the want of principles which enables you to get on with those whose principles are different, but your manner of asserting those to which you adhere. Worms wriggle, and snails crawl; but they are tolerated neither in the lower nor the higher places of the earth.

And as it is with individuals in society, so I believe it is in affairs of the largest scale, even when the contracting or engaged parties are of the highest kind. Christianity gains nothing by treating Nature as her enemy. Men are not converted by being told they are scoundrels, or by being treated as probable scoundrels. A believer in Christianity will never conciliate the confidence of one who sees serious difficulties in revelation by assuming that none but a dishonest mind can see such difficulties or be unable to solve them. It is certain that if I go into a large number of shops to make purchases, I shall come across some dealers who would cheat me if they could; but if I assume that every tradesman is a rogue, and commence my dealing on the expectation that he will certainly swindle me unless I keep the sharpest look-out upon him, the chances are that before a few hours are over I shall be kicked ignominiously out into the street as a swindler myself.

So, too, I believe that no small amount of the difficulties touched on by the able writers of the articles to which I have referred is to be put down to an unwillingness on the part of sincerely religious men, whether Catholics or not, to give credit for fair dealing to those whose religious creed is different from their own. If English Catholics wish to make the temporal power their enemy, the surest way is to assume and to show that they *expect* it to be such. It is the same in all minor details; in society, in literature, in personal relations. If we begin with the hypothesis that a man who dissents from our personal ideas of religion, therefore has no conscience, no law of morals common to him and to ourselves, no common ideas of duty to God, no views on natural ties which we share with him, and that accordingly he will infallibly take

us in if he can,* we may rest assured that the inevitable result will be that he will immediately suspect us, that he will attribute the same cunning to us which we attribute to him, and place himself upon his guard against our insidious approaches as those of a secret deadly enemy.

You may possibly differ from me in the opinion; at any rate, some of your readers may differ; but I cannot but express my conviction that the *personal* differences between one man and another are very far from being as exaggerated as are the differences between their professed opinions. If we could take the most bitterly antagonistic opponents, and strip them of the externals of their minds, tearing away their habits, personal antipathies and idiosyncrasies, making them use the same terms with the same meaning, and laying bare the essential indestructible humanity of each, I am persuaded that we should find existing in their minds a degree of similarity, of community, of even unity, for which we should be little prepared. It is one of the results of that mysterious *loneliness* in which it is the will of our Creator that every human soul should pass its life, that in the commerce of society, whether as individuals or communities, we should be more keenly sensitive to the points in which we differ from one another, or where our interests clash, than to those in which we agree in principle and feeling, and pursue harmonious though not identical ends. A needless, irrational, and all but unconquerable natural repulsion, seems to be the most powerful of all the agents which operate in the work of human social life. It is easier to make a thousand enemies than one friend.

And thus it comes to pass, that while an essential and eternal harmony exists in all the works of God, whether of nature or revelation, they are perpetually forced into a practical opposition by our own unwillingness to give to one another the benefit of every doubt. All the ends which God designs to be accomplished by the things He has created *must*, by the very nature of the case, be harmonious. To suppose that the thorough and hearty carrying out any portion of the vast system of human thought and existence, in its own sphere and on its own basis, can by any possibility tend to interfere with the accomplishment of any other of the Divine purposes, is to arraign the wisdom of God, and to introduce a virtual Manichæism into the Divine Nature Itself. Wherever any thing that exists, and which is not moral evil,

* Burke (*Works*, vol. i. p. 404) writes thus to a Catholic: "In your situation I would be so far a friend to the court, as not to give occasion to every friend to the constitution to become an enemy to me and my cause."—*Ed. R.*

seems to clash, by its inherent tendencies, with any thing else that exists, we may assume as an axiom that the fault lies in some misapprehension or perversion of our own. Time is not eternity; but time is the mundane image of eternity. The body is not the soul; but the soul cannot now act except through the instrumentality of the brain. The knowledge of the laws of nature is not the knowledge of miracles; but it is by knowing what is a natural law that we come to know what is a supernatural interruption of a law. An examination of the motives on which I myself and my companions always act is not equivalent to a complete system of metaphysics and psychology; but it is only by such a self-examination, and such deductions from the conduct of those around me, that I can conclude that the testimony of the apostles to the Resurrection of Jesus Christ is to be confidently relied upon. And when we attempt to promote the interests of any one of these objects of our regard *at the expense* of any other, on the ground that there is some inherent antagonism between them, we are acting neither as philosophers nor as Christians.

The practical result of the adoption of this system of "counter-irritation" is usually a serious increase of that pernicious theory which has been termed "Cæsarism;" namely, the intrusion of the secular power into the domain of conscience, and the erection of the sovereign, whether Cæsar, king, or president, into an authority for deciding what man shall believe respecting the invisible world. True it is that the personal possessors of temporal authority, and the devoted students of temporal science, are quite ready enough to usurp this power without any provocation from without. Human selfishness and human ignorance are always so influential, that kings and sophists do not wait to be treated as the tyrants of the soul and the enemies of revelation in order to assume the initiative in their despotism and their warfare. But because they are ready enough to do mischief of their own accord, are we wise to irritate them to tenfold excesses by adopting an antagonistic error instead of an antagonistic truth? Easy indeed it is—fatally easy—to suppose that whatever contradicts a falsehood must be itself true. Yet there may be ten thousand possible falsehoods on any given subject, all mutually contradictory and mutually destructive, and yet not one of them come near the real truth. To oppose those who exaggerate the rights, duties, and territories of the natural order of things by treating the natural order as in itself not harmonious in its independence with the supernatural, is to drive them into tenfold exaggerations, and to confirm them in their suspicions that the advocates of revealed truth and spiritual

independence are charlatans, or hypocrites, or selfish worldlings, or incurable votaries of ignorance and superstition. The writer of the article on the Education Commission has pointed out with singular force the operation of this law in the case he has in hand. And such will invariably be the result wherever we overlook great principles under the influence of wounded feelings, or even of well-grounded suspicions. The adherence to the fundamental principles of religion and philosophy—things in themselves eternally inseparable—through evil and good, through mistakes and misapprehensions, through bribery and hostility, through failures and through successes, is our only guarantee for permanent success in the bewilderment of public and private anxieties and the clash of hostile interests. It is like the operation of an iron will, before which almost all things bend and yield; except that the mere will may go astray, and so ultimately prove the ruin of its possessor. It was once said to me by a person of rare genius, that a man who has a clear and steady view of his own possesses an indefinite power for influencing others. And if this is true—as I firmly believe it is—in smaller things, how true must it be when we penetrate to the very basis of all our knowledge, when we search out the Divine principle on which all this vast, and complicated, and glorious, and mysterious fabric is created, in which our own lot is cast, and of which each one of us constitutes an infinitesimally minute, yet a really organic element!

If I understand aright the principles of those numerous practical arrangements termed *Concordats*, which from century to century have been made between the Pope and the secular power, they have frequently been based upon this very recognition of the essential harmony of all things and institutions which proceed from the one universal Creator. It is the fashion nowadays to call these arrangements “compromises,” a word which implies an antagonism between the contracting parties. I am far from being sufficiently learned in politico-religious history to be able to speak with any confidence on the matter; but I very much question whether this idea that the *principle* of Concordats is that of compromise is not more or less of modern growth.* That Concordats frequently have been the most glaring compromises, I do not for a moment deny. Often they have hardly amounted to the nature of a

* If the idea of a compromise is of modern growth, so is the Concordat. It was a consequence of the obscurantism in men's minds, especially in statesmen, of our correspondent's very true and just notion that the Church and the State have the same origin, and the same ultimate objects. While this was understood, there were no Concordats;—there were none at the revival of the Empire, with Charlemagne, or with Otho. The first thing we call by the name is the Calix-

peace between the belligerents ; they have been mere truces, regulations for a period of armed passiveness. But that in older times the *idea* of Concordats, or whatever they were then termed, was that of a mutual giving-up of antagonistic rights for the sake of the conflicting interests of the two parties, I venture altogether to doubt. I suspect that in the majority of instances they were once regarded simply as arrangements for the *convenience* of both parties, who were regarded as aiming at harmonious though not identical ends ; and that their origin was not suspicion but friendship.

There is a further practical consideration, which ought to enter into all our calculations in affairs in which the interests of Christianity and of secular rights and duties are supposed to come into collision. It is certain that an individual who professes to be in possession of the highest and purest truth, and to make the propagation of religion his special aim, must be judged by a stricter standard of action than any that is applied to men of lower pretensions. And the same in the case of any corporate body of men which bears on its front these lofty claims. The moment a man comes before you, and tells you that while you are in possession of natural truth only, he is in possession of revealed truth also ; that while your aims are secular, his are spiritual ; that while you are busied only with men's bodies, he is occupied with their souls ; by that very allegation he submits to be tested by a more rigorous rule, and must be held to be false to his cause if he is not found superior to the infirmities of those whom he loudly proclaims to be less enlightened than himself. It is his boast that he knows more than other men, that he is in possession of divine aid of which they are deprived, and that his aim is nothing less than the highest which can conceivably be sought for by a created being. What, then, is the natural and the just consequence ? That every time he betrays the common infirmities of humanity he is held to be worse than those whom he looks down upon when they display the very same infirmities ; that his peccadilloes are magnified into grave sins, his displays of temper or irritation into signs that his creed is powerless to teach him self-control ; and his unwillingness to overlook the faults of his opponents into a proof that self-advancement and worldly aggrandise-

time Concordat of 1122 ; but the appellation does not belong to it, and was unheard of at the time. It was first used early in the fifteenth century, when the old harmony was dissolved, and real compromises needed and made. When states were no longer inspired with the principles of the Church, the Pope tried to bind them by compact and agreement, purchased and consecrated by some sacrifice on his part, to a line of conduct which they would no longer follow spontaneously.—*Ed. R.*

ment are his real aims. Those who claim to be the exclusive expounders of unadulterated truth, and the exclusive holders of the most efficacious of God's graces, cannot logically be judged by the same standard as their opponents. They must be not only the equals of their opponents in every Christian virtue, they must be their manifest and incontestable superiors, if they expect to hold their ground for a single day. Mediocrity in virtue is fatal to the Catholic claims.

But further, not only does a forgetfulness of the divine origin of all things not morally evil tend to aggravate the Cæsarism which is one of the characteristic dangers of modern times,—it tends directly to the increase of absolute unbelief in Christianity altogether. Whatever be the deistic or pantheistic tendencies of learned and philosophic men in this country—and they are rarely actual atheists—it is certain that Manichæism is not their error. A “Cambridge Graduate” has indeed just published a production in which he upholds the eternity of the evil principle; but I fancy that he must be solitary in his speculations. The thinking world has at least got hold of the grand truth that the universe is the work and the manifestation of infinite wisdom and goodness, even when this conviction is perverted into a species of pantheism. And of all the most prolific means for preventing it from acquiescing in the divine origin of Christianity, none can be more operative than that dread of natural knowledge, and of all things which existed prior to Christianity, which is unhappily manifested by some persons zealous for Christianity. It is a fatal thing to see the relics of old, effete Tory prejudice lingering still in upright and serious minds. I am not personally acquainted with many such myself; yet I *have* known men and women, amiable, pious, and benevolent, who have used towards the promoters of this new energetic movement language not very dissimilar to that which the greatest of poets has put into the mouth of Jack Cade: “Thou hast most traitorously corrupted the youth of the realm in erecting a grammar-school: and whereas before our forefathers had no other books than the score and the tally, thou hast caused printing to be used; and contrary to the king, his crown and dignity, thou hast built a paper-mill. It will be proved to thy face, that thou hast men about thee who usually talk of a noun and a verb, and such abominable words as no Christian ear can endure to hear.”

What is all this, too, but a semi-Manichæan distrust of the operation of those faculties of the mind which our Creator has given to us, under the idea that they *tend* to the destruc-

tion of virtue and the laws of society? Why, I may ask, is there naturally more danger to religion in teaching a poor man to think, to read, to write, to cast accounts, than in sustaining his corporeal frame, in teaching him to work for his bread, and generally in fostering all the lower portions of his nature? Is not a man's understanding as truly the work of God, and given to him for the purpose of being employed, as are his body, his passions, and his emotions? Is it according to common sense and religion to imagine that while it is perfectly safe to raise the condition of the poor in those points which we have in common with the brutes, it is unsafe to raise it in those gifts which are a reflection, though faint, of the Divine Nature Itself?

We hear much groaning, and witness much shaking of the head, at the supposed "pride of knowledge." But is it not true that where knowledge makes one man proud, ignorance makes a hundred men conceited? I ask you, sir, and your intelligent readers, Is any mischief so pernicious as the mischief perpetrated by fools? and if they are what are somewhat irreverently termed "pious fools," does that much mend the matter? For myself, I never yet found a blockhead easier to deal with than a person of even the smallest genuine intelligence. What is your experience? What that of your clerical readers? Are the stupid, the ignorant, the *laudatores temporis acti*, the most manageable members of their congregations? Among the very poor, do they not find that there is no brutality so hopelessly incurable as that which is redeemed by no touch of intellectual taste or cultivation?

That the spread of knowledge, and the cultivation of physical and moral science, tends directly to the destruction of false religions, I not only do not deny, on the contrary, I rejoice to believe that such is the case. Nor are we wise if we shut our eyes to the probability of a continual increase of the critical spirit, as applied to all things not of the essence of the one true religion. For those who count that faith is made most secure by "keeping all things quiet," I admit that the prospect is dreary enough. There is no power on earth that will prevent the human intelligence from applying tests more and more rigorously logical to all things that falsely claim to be the true religion, or which accidentally may in any age or country fasten themselves upon the true religion. And considering how prone we all are to mistake habits of thought for well-grounded reasons of thought, none of us can say that he personally is to be exempt from the lot of humanity, or to be spared the necessity of yielding up this or that long-cherished prejudice or opinion under the pressure of a more

rigid logic than he has hitherto counted necessary. Yet the revelation of Jesus Christ, and the Church which He founded, are not banished from the earth because Galileo's views as to the earth and the sun have proved correct. In those stormy times, when modern criticism and philosophy were in all the eagerness of youth, the telescope was held to be the devil's spy-glass by those who imagined that if the earth was shown to move round the sun, there was an end of the Bible and the Gospel together. But the Bible and the Gospel still exist, though we have all come to admit that the principle of scriptural interpretation on which men read the celebrated passage about the sun standing still is absolutely and necessarily untenable. Against ignorance, craft, superstitions, corruptions, well-meant blunderings, false positions, hypotheses, and the whole giant structure of things which exist only in the imaginations of mankind, I admit that the advance of education threatens a deadly warfare. For those, therefore, who prefer a pleasant sham to a stern reality, the future has few charms. The longer they live, the worse they will find their lot. It remains for them only to sigh, and exclaim "*Après nous le déluge!*" and feebly try to stem the advancing waters with a heap of old watchwords and prejudices, and all the decaying lumber which can be ferreted out from garret-cupboards and boxes of pawnbrokers' unredeemed pledges. Such at least is the future as it appears to me; though, after all, I am but a speculator like my neighbours, and the telescope with which I seek to pry into futurity may be but a twopenny kaleidoscope, fit only to be a children's toy.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

C.

FOREIGN PROTESTANT VIEW OF ENGLAND IN 1596.

WE believe that the following report of the state of England at home and in its foreign relations has never yet been published. It seems to have been drawn up by M. du Vair, the secretary to the Duke de Bouillon* and M. de Sancy,† am-

* Bouillon had become a Protestant at the age of twenty-one. He was the most powerful of the Huguenot nobles; a man, says Richelieu, of no religion, and great ambition. He was the father of Turenne.

† Sancy, who is highly commended by Thuanus, had become a Catholic soon after Henry IV., saying that it was well to be of the religion of one's prince.

bassadors extraordinary from Henry IV. of France to Queen Elizabeth of England in 1596, and commissioned to get Elizabeth and the Dutch United Provinces to enter with him into a league, offensive and defensive, against Spain. The report, though short, and containing such inaccuracies as a foreigner who had only resided some months in the country would naturally fall into, is very interesting, especially so far as relates to the internal state of the country. In estimating its value, it must always be remembered that the Duc de Bouillon was a Protestant; so that this report, drawn up in his name by his secretary, is a foreign Protestant's view of the state of England after nearly half a century of Protestant government. The insight that it gives us of Henry IV.'s policy with regard to England is also valuable, as it will lead us to see the reasons why that king made such a point of purchasing to himself a party among the English Catholics, and how it came to pass that the party of the appellant priests, patronised by Dodd and Dr. Lingard and Mr. Tierney, were, after all, only paid catspaws of the French king, employed by him and his ministers to subserve French policy in England, even at the risk of ruining religion; a risk which, as Dr. Lingard owns, was ripened into a deplorable reality.*

Report on the State of England; addressed to King Henry IV. by his Ambassador, the Duc de Bouillon, in 1596.

"In spite of its northerly position, the climate of England is mild, on account of the rains which fall for at least two-thirds of the year; whichever way the wind blows, it rains. There are many rivers, almost all small; the soil is fertile in grain, and good for pasturage; fruits are abundant and various; there used to be vineyards, and some have been fresh planted within the last four years; *pastel* was formerly grown; melons ripen in hot seasons. There are good mines of lead and copper, and some little silver is found.

The state consists of three divisions—the church, the nobles, and the people: of these the parliament consists; of the church, only the prelates have seats; of the nobles, none below the barons (about sixty-four persons, certainly not more); the rest of the churchmen and nobles vote with the people by representatives. The power of the barons is very great, in consequence of a war with King John, whereby they secured great privileges: but the nobility is much decreased and deteriorated because nearly all the dukes and earls have had their estates confiscated and annexed to the royal domains, and the present earls and barons have only their names and titles, without any feudal jurisdiction; but the titles are hereditary. No one in England has the right of high or mean jurisdiction, but only

* The two reports were copied from a volume in the Bibliothèque Impériale of Paris: *Fonds de Brienne*, no. 37, pp. 109 and 106 verso.

a low jurisdiction, which is only good to exact their rents and dues. The greatest number of what nobility is left are much ruined and indebted through the monstrous expenses of dress and of the numbers of serving-men which they maintain. They often visit one another in the country during the hunting-season, and with great extravagance; and besides their natural inclination to luxury, their endeavour to emulate those of their number who have made their fortune by the Indies or by piracy has largely involved them, so that most of them owe more than they are worth, and the mercantile class is acquiring the lands of the gentry. When a father dies intestate, the younger sons have nothing; so that many junior members of good families take to mercantile and other still baser and shamefuller callings, so that even mountebanks have been known, after the deaths of their elder brothers, to succeed to the greatest dignities of the highest families. In the higher classes ranks are very undefined; they often make unequal matches, and some of the highest ladies in the realm are married to very low persons, chiefly widows, who often marry their servants, and for all that do not lose the rank they acquired by their first husbands.

The middle class is very rich, because it lives with great economy, feeds grossly, and is not rifled with charges and taxes. The towns are opulent by reason of their traffic, which, with the wealth of the merchants, has much decreased since the Spanish war; so that Bristol, which was one of the most opulent towns on the Welsh coast, is now quite ruined; for the Hollanders and Zealanders have drawn away all the traffic, and there are so many pirates on the seas that the losses are very frequent. The principal English exports are lead, copper, cloth, and corn. Their ships sail to all parts—the East, the Indies, Africa, and Muscovy; but they find the last voyage very ruinous because of the Russian faithlessness and tyranny.

Justice is administered by provincial judges, who go alternately on circuits of three months. There are judges of fact, and judges of right: for the fact there are certain *experts*, who give their opinion in writing, “proven” or “not proven,” and then the judges pronounce according to the law. Besides these there are judges of conscience, the chancellor and the master of requests, before whom those who have bad cases according to the rigour of the law take their causes, and demand equity. For instance, in giving a bond, they usually promise to repay twice as much as they have received, and nevertheless it is ruled that if the debtor pays the simple principal within the terms of the bond, he is quit of the rest; and these bonds are not only tolerated, but legalised; but if the borrower does not pay within the term, he may then put the case into Chancery, provided his cause is not already before another court; and there, if his plea of poverty or otherwise is allowed, he is only condemned in the original sum. The laws are preserved in the old Norman language, and there are many interpreters of their system; law is much studied, and almost entirely by gentlemen. Justice in Eng-

land is reckoned to be very venal and very corrupt. There is no severity except for matters of state, where it is exceedingly summary and rigorous. All actions begin with the arrest of the defendant; but a man cannot be arrested in his own house. There is scarcely an attempt to punish the piracy which is carried on against friend and foe alike, because of the pickings which the highest personages make out of it.

There are two universities, Oxford and Cambridge, of great renown, and with endowments of more than 200,000 crowns for the maintenance of students in law, which is only professed there. The chief faculty is theology. At both places they are much divided into sects: in philosophy, into Ramists and Aristotelians; in theology, into Puritans and followers of the queen's confession. For the last two years their disputes and differences have waxed so warm, that matters have come almost to sedition, even on such points as 'whether Christians are allowed to act in comedies and tragedies,' and 'whether preachers may quote the fathers and texts in Greek and Latin in their sermons.'

Religion throughout the land speaks with most stammering tongue. The greatest part holds to the reformation of the queen; others are Catholics, others Puritans or Calvinists. The queen does not much like the Puritans, because of certain books they printed at Geneva, wherein the government of women is condemned, and their authority in ecclesiastical regimen denied, and because she thinks the Calvinist ministers too busy.* They are also disliked by the English prelates, because they do not recognise them, and controvert their authority as much as they may.

At London there is some devotion, and the people are well and diligently taught. In the temples there is not any thing like the same reverence that there is among the French Catholics. In the country there is scarce any instruction, and scarce any worship. At court and throughout the realm there are many libertines, who profess nothing but gallantry, liberty, and free-will; there is even talk that the filthiest and most abominable pleasures are much practised.

In manners this people is commonly proud, disdainful, and full of hatred to strangers. They are very covetous, and for money will undertake any thing you propose to them: they have no lasting friendship for one another; they eat and drink to excess; they do not give much honour to their wives, and their wives do not return them much affection. Neither literature nor science has much weight with them: valour and nobility are much esteemed; and of a truth this people is monstrous brave and warlike.

The government depends entirely on the queen, who has made the people obey her wonderfully, and at the same time respect and love her. Formerly the parliament had much authority, but now it

* It must be remembered that the Duc de Bouillon was a Protestant, which accounts for the very weak grounds here given for the queen's dislike of Calvinists.

turns where she wills,—because the prelates depend upon her ; the barons are but few, and dare not thwart her ; and the people, having experienced the mildness and utility of her rule, consents to all she wishes. She is a princess of great confidence, courage, and accomplishments ; she speaks Spanish, Italian, French, and Latin ; understands Greek ; knows something of science and of history ; comprehends exceedingly well the affairs of her own kingdom, is not ignorant of those of her neighbours, and has a sound judgment. She is choleric and violent among her own people, more than befits her sex. Though she has great and generous intentions, she is excessively afraid of expense, and is less liberal than she should be ; instead of giving, she wants people to give to her ; and there is not a presentation that she does not make more than 60,000 crowns of. If she goes on a visit to any one, he cannot make her good cheer without making her a present at parting. The country blames her for having appropriated 60,000 crowns which Drake had intrusted to the Mayor of London, though he was at sea in her service ; as also for having kept certain condemned lords a long while in prison, in order to enjoy their and their wives' estates during their confinement. Though she is sixty-three years old, she still dresses like a girl. Her lovers have always had much influence on the government ; much, not all. She has had the very laudable prudence to defer much to those whom she knew to be useful in governing her kingdom, and by their weight has balanced the lightness of her favourites. The Earl of Essex is now chief favourite, and the lord-treasurer [Burghley] chief manager. The earl is a young lord of fine spirit and high courage ; but because he is not over punctual in his constancy to the queen, and makes her somewhat jealous by certain private affections, he is supposed to be somewhat in disgrace, and his present voyage is thought to be an honourable dismissal. Nevertheless the queen's nature is not easily to forget those she has loved ; and since this young lord has great credit in the kingdom, it is thought that he will be altogether ruined or entirely restored.

The lord-treasurer is a consummate man of business, immensely rich, well allied, of grand designs, but nearly used up. He seems much more interested in home than in foreign affairs, in which his counsels are timid and ungenerous. He is rude and ungracious ;* he does whatever he can think on to establish his son, Sir Robert Cecil, in the management of affairs,—in fact, he has already procured for him the place of secretary of state, but up to this time he has not obtained the patent : this makes people think that after his death his family, which is extremely hated and envied in England, will not continue to enjoy the great treasures it is supposed to possess. The other members of the council are merely ciphers, and there exists a disorder among them, the more remarkable as being

* His reluctance to yield to the wishes of the French king had led to a suspension of the negotiations, and the French plenipotentiaries were about to depart when they received a message from the queen which resulted in the wished-for treaty.

so contrary to the queen's usual illiberality. She allows her counsellors to take her farms at a rent far below their value, and besides most of them die indebted for great arrears. Her receipts are almost all held by gentlemen, who make out of them great profit, which serves as their pay. So much for internal affairs.

In her external relations the queen and the King of Scots are at present good friends; and he, on his part, tries to insinuate himself into her favour and that of the English nobles by all kinds of service. He has just renewed the declaration in his parliament that the Spanish king's hostilities against England were prejudicial to his right as heir presumptive of the crown, wherefore he intended to employ all the forces of Scotland for the defence of England. He has caused notice of this to be given to Elizabeth, more, it is always thought, to seize such a plausible occasion for trumpeting his rights and maintaining his pretensions than for any other reason. She is on very bad terms with the people of the Low Countries, because she has treated them very rudely and contemptuously, and shown that she had deep schemes upon them and their fortified places; which schemes they have opposed so decidedly as to besiege and take by force the places whose governors were supposed to favour the English, and even to behead a Flemish gentleman who was leading an enterprise against Leyden on behalf of the Earl of Leicester. Moreover some witnesses, before the earl's death, discovered to her that he had formed the design of making peace with the King of Spain at her expense. She takes wonderfully to heart the confidence which the Low Countrymen have in the name of the French king, and since their aiding him she has taken occasion to dun them incessantly for what they owe her, amounting to more than 1,500,000 crowns; they are about to pay her, and that done, to make her remove her garrisons from the towns of Zealand. The Osterlings are dissatisfied with England because it has taken away the privileges they used to enjoy; and their resentment has come to such a pitch, that they have driven the English from all their towns, and have obliged them to retire to Stade. Elizabeth has always pretended to have some exceedingly intimate dealings with the French king, both on account of the religion which he professed at first, [and as a blind to the fact that the King] of Spain helps himself to certain places, and has maintained people among the retainers of some lords of this kingdom, and indeed still maintains them. It seems that at present the growth of the French king's power fills her with suspicion, and she makes no secret of her fear of his making peace with the King of Spain. It appears that she would give him no assistance; she has entered into hostilities with the King of Spain, but hitherto she has not dared to declare war. Succouring the Low Countries, she says, is the traditional policy of England in alliance with the house of Burgundy; and again in her present naval enterprise she has had the declaration made in the names of the captains. People suppose that it is the lord-treasurer who keeps her in this humour, and in hopes of peace with Spain. Many

think that his intention is to make the government fall, after the queen's death, into Spanish hands; for he has often shown his hostility to Scotland, which is favoured by Denmark, France, and the people of England, and to which he can therefore oppose nothing but Spain. But it seems that the King of Spain does not like waiting so long, and that he meditates an immediate *coup* upon England; for, besides his former demonstrations, he has this year caused a book on his right to the English crown to be circulated in the country; and a little while ago there was seized a letter, dated Brussels, May 26, 1596, wherein a Jesuit declared that at last a male Judith had been found to deliver the Church from this female Holofernes. Moreover any one can see the great naval preparations he is daily making for war, and it is easy to judge what facilities the conquest of England would give him for the reconquest of the Low Countries, and even of France. It is said in England that the Duke of Alva, towards the close of his life, counselled the King of Spain either to make peace with England or to undertake its conquest, otherwise war would only teach the English to be malicious, and show them the way to go and trouble the Indies. If I am to judge from arguments, and the present state of circumstances, of the chances of peace, and of the probability of the Spaniards' success in England, I should think that no great change can happen during the lifetime of the queen. At home she is so beloved by the people, and the great persons who are malcontented have so little credit, that it is impossible for any would-be revolutionist to gain many followers. Moreover, considering the queen's age, those who desire revolution have so much to hope from her death, which naturally, they think, cannot be long delayed, that they would rather wait in safety for this to happen than precipitate matters with extreme danger to themselves and little chance of success. Abroad, the King of Spain, the only person she has cause to fear, must be delayed in undertaking this conquest for the same reasons. But if, by reason of his advancing years, he has ambition to make the attempt before he dies, there is little appearance of his being able to succeed. For though the country lies very open, and the landing is very easy; though the land is weak internally,—yet the King of Spain cannot hinder the English, with the Hollanders and Zealanders, being as strong as he by sea, and even on shore when he is landed; nor can he hinder the English and Scotch united from being stronger, seeing that the King of Scotland can help England for an emergency of six weeks with 15,000 or 16,000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry. But if the queen were to die, the troubles on account of the succession would doubtless give the Catholics occasion to rise, and give their hand to whoever would re-establish them; and private feuds would throw many on this side, many even of those who now declare openly against the King of Spain. In this case, it seems very likely that if the King of Spain finds himself with an army ready to throw itself into England, he will gain it easily; and it appears that nothing can hinder this *coup* but the good success of

the voyage of the Earl of Essex. For so, continuing in authority with the queen and in favour with the people, he may, with the help of France, Denmark, and the United Provinces, give his hand to the King of Scots, and establish him in England in no time."

*Apology for the Event of the Negotiation.**

"Since perhaps many will think it strange that in this negotiation the English showed so little anxiety for the safety of France, even though their own was involved, and that the French diplomatists entered into the league under conditions too unfavourable to the king their master, and obliged him to continue the war with insufficient resources when all the French people were sighing for peace, I have thought good to set down their reasons.

When the Spaniards' heart was high for the successes of Doullans and Cambray, and the French proportionately depressed, the capture of Calais made men stand aghast before Spanish prowess,† and the consternation spread into England, and the Hollanders and Zealanders began to grumble much. Moreover, as a fresh cause of fear, it was known that there were imperial ambassadors at Brussels on their way to the United Provinces, to summon them on the part of the empire to make peace with the King of Spain for the good of Christendom, and for this end to offer them all they could ask: on the other side, the whole English council seemed inclined to peace with the King of Spain, and held in their hands a very easy means to obtain it, namely Flushing and Brille in Holland; and there had already been talk in England of exchanging Flushing for Calais. Now there could be no doubt that if Holland or England first made this peace, then France would lie at the mercy of the King of Spain, who could turn all his forces against her, and, with the advantages he already has gained, might easily crush her. To guard against this blow, there was no other expedient than to get the Queen of England to enter into obligations to go to war with the King of Spain, which no one hitherto could ever make her resolve to do. By this means we have obliged her to help France; we have made Holland aware that she will be aided and sustained by her two powerful neighbours; moreover we have made the Queen of England, who up to this time would promise nothing, consent to the protected provinces of the Low Countries uniting themselves to France, and helping the king as much as they can. And hereby we

* *Fonds de Brienne*, p. 106 verso.

† It filled even Cecil with admiration, who, so far from sharing the general alarm, told Sancy "that he considered the Spaniards worthy of the highest praise for having set about so important an enterprise, and for having so skilfully deceived the King of France by the rapidity and the secrecy of their movements." Flassan, *Histoire de la Diplomatie française*, ii. 159. The good understanding had cooled since Henry's conversion. He vainly urged Essex, who commanded a fleet in the Channel, to rescue Calais. Elizabeth secretly offered to save the town from the Spaniards by occupying it herself. Henry turned his back on her envoy, saying, "I had rather be bitten by a lion than by a lioness." *Lettres missives de Henri IV*, iv. 573.

have made the King of Spain understand that there are no hopes of his attacking France singly on that side; also, by the hope of this aid, the afflicted provinces, which were in despair of being guarded by the forces of France, have been reassured, and the reputation of the King of France has been re-established among foreigners, who usually only favour those whom they think already strong, and capable of defending themselves.

With regard to the objection that this treaty has cut off the chances of a peace or truce, of which there was some little hope and a great desire in the heart of the people, not only is it the height of simplicity to believe that we could have an honourable or sure peace with an enemy that has gained such advantages, but it is also certain that the king cannot speak of peace or truce for himself without abandoning Holland to the mercy of the Spanish king; after the reunion of which to Spain, France, in her present condition, will be in great danger: neither can he make peace or truce apart without exposing England to invasion, after the conquest of which no one can suppose that France could hold out against Spain, which could draw from England the men she wanted for the conquest of France. Therefore, if we must have peace, the only surety would be to make it in common with all conferring parties.

And nevertheless, if it were decided that it was necessary to make peace apart from France, so far from this negotiation having made it more difficult, it would, on the contrary, have facilitated it; for (1) it makes peace more desirable for the King of Spain, for fear of the possible confederation of all the princes against him: (2) the treaty has been concluded, reserving the good pleasure of the king; so that he was still at liberty to accept it, or to be better advised if any other course is offered: (3) by this treaty the king is less engaged to continue the war than he was before; for in the year 1593 the King of France and Queen of England had promised one another, purely and simply, by letters-patent signed and sealed, never to make peace or agreement with the King of Spain without one another's consent. By the present treaty this former obligation is silently pretermitted, and subjected to the condition of the execution of the offensive league, which will never be so executed as not to leave some loophole, by the defaults of the confederates, to treat of peace when need requires, and that with pretexts much more just and more reasonable than could have been alleged against the preceding obligation; besides that there never has been such a league made as would disable the confederates, be its clauses what they may, from providing for their own safety in case of need; for confederations are not entered into to ruin, but to save the confederating states, and no prince can lawfully bind his kingdom to its own ruin."

The event provided for in the last clause of this apology occurred in little more than a year, and in the beginning of 1598 there was much talk of a private negotiation between Philip II. and Henry IV. The following are extracts from

letters printed in the *Mémoires de Bellieure et de Sillery*, 1696, pp. 52, 57, and 158 :

Bellieure and Sillery to Villeroy, Feb. 12, 1598.

"As for the negotiation, we must come out of it with honour : but if we wait for the counsel of the Queen of England and of the Provinces, we shall have ten years of war, and peace never ; without them the negotiation would be finished in eight days."

Henry IV. to Bellieure and Sillery, Feb. 15, 1598.

"It is most certain that only God and reason have any power over me in such occasions ; but since the first commands and obliges me to have a care of the people He has placed under me, and the second to seek the common good of Christendom, as a good prince ought, I will never be ill-advised enough to follow the wishes and opinions of those whose private interests would have me lose the occasion of doing good to both at once."

Bellieure and Sillery to the King, March 25, 1598.

"The legate says that it is Elizabeth's impudence that wants to lead Henry to break with Philip altogether, as Henry sustains all the cost of the war. She wants to make herself sole umpire of peace and war, and will do you more harm by her dissimulations than the King of Spain by his armies."

The same to the same, April 3, 1598.

"Elizabeth thinks that if she delays, something will happen to oblige Henry IV. to continue the war. This is the only means left her to prevent France recovering Calais, which she fears worse than death. But God has made Henry king of France to preserve his subjects in peace, repose, and felicity, and not to satisfy the ill-will of those who consider that the surety of their happiness depends on the ruin of the French. So they urge Henry to conclude peace for himself, in spite of the suspicious delay of England and Holland in sending their ambassadors."

Correspondence.

To the Editor of the Rambler.

SIR,—I take a great interest in all that concerns art, and read whatever appears in your journal from time to time on the subject with pleasure, and commonly with profit. Your usual course is rational, honest, and independent ; but the introduction to your first article of this month, "The Christmas of Christian Art," seems to me to fail in these conditions, and to be open therefore to grave objection. I am not objecting to Professor Minardi's lecture : it is well to place before us the opinions

of foreign critics, since by the conflict of opinion the rules of art are settled, as the comity of nations derives a form from the conflict of laws. But, departing from your usual reserve, you introduce the Italian *maestro* with such a partisan flourish that I hardly recognise you. I shall look with some curiosity for the results of a pupilage under a gentleman who is "unrivalled" in knowledge of his art, and "unapproachable" in practical skill. To my shame be it said, I am totally unacquainted with the triumphs of the professor's pencil.

You say that the first impulse of an Englishman, on seeing a picture, is not to receive pleasure, but to resist successfully its mute appeal for praise. It is clear you have never been to the Exhibition of the Royal Academy. Perhaps Trafalgar Square and its squirts are too much for your feelings. If you had ever been hustled by the tens of thousands who frequent that shilling gallery, you must have been struck by their gaping, unsophisticated, and loudly-expressed admiration for pictures of every degree of merit and demerit. All is good fish in the net of those jolly pleasure-seekers. Bilious critics are few in the crowds who gaze on the gay walls of that dingy national palace of art.

Again, you say that the "barbarous incongruities of Pugin, and the ridiculous ruffianism of Ruskin, are enough to destroy art for a whole generation." Not so. The vigorous labours of Pugin have done infinitely more good in the formation of architects of *all* schools than his crotchets have done harm. The latter were personal: their influence died with the man. Mr. Ruskin's crotchets are more mischievous, and undoubtedly deface his criticisms and weaken their value; but his works have done much in drawing attention to principles forgotten and overlooked. To stigmatise him as a "ridiculous ruffian," is only to invite the "retort courteous" from him.

Your succeeding remarks look like a sneer against the use of colour in ornament. You say, "Painted ciphers are mere tricks; and coloured inscriptions belong to calligraphy, not painting (except sign-painting)." Decorative art, in which painted ciphers and coloured inscriptions may hold no obscure or unimportant place, does not belong to the writing-master, but to the artist. It is as true art in its degree as the most wonderful picture that ever left the easel of Fra Bartolomeo. The arabesques of the *loggie* of the Vatican have never induced any critic to count Raffaele among sign-painters.

Again, you inform us that the skill to construct a picture or building that shall be mistaken for one of the twelfth or thirteenth centuries belongs to the art of forgery, not that of painting or architecture. Not so. The forger is one who substitutes an imitation of little or no value for the thing itself. But if I paint a copy of a picture with such skill that it may be taken for the original, I am but a clever copyist, and no forger. To fix the character of swindler on me, I must substitute my copy for the thing itself, and so obtain dishonest gain; the value of an original being composite of its intrinsic merit and its identity as the acknowledged work of an individual not myself. Likewise with a building. If I so study the principles of a style of architecture as to produce a building with such definite proportion and accuracy of detail as belong to that style, I am simply a clever Gothic, Roman, or other class architect, as the case may be: I am no forger. But if I carve a statue, a fragment of any sort, and produce it as a genuine antiquity or visible proof of any theory, either for fame or filthy lucre, then am I a forger and a knave.

In conclusion, let me remark that, notwithstanding your strictures, art always was, now is, and always will be, more or less a matter of

commerce. When religious sentiment was "up" in the market, pictures were produced thereby; but they were paid for, and handsomely too (save in exceptional cases), in very worldly coin. I am therefore prepared for the inconsistency with which you lament that the "quiet and pious minds," who are to be consoled by the professor's lecture, may never be numerous enough to turn "the stream of public patronage" in favour of real religious art. The stream of public patronage is valued chiefly, I think, for the nuggets it contains.

Asking your pardon for the plain manner of my speech, and having only the consistency of your career in these matters at heart,

I remain, sir, your constant reader,

* * *

[Our respected correspondent has mistaken our drift. After our expression of gratitude to Signor Minardi for his courtesy, we remain perfectly independent of him. Next, the resisting Englishman we spoke of was not one of the gaping ignoramuses, but one of the critics, especially one of those conventional critics who do not consider the principles of art, but the rules and precedents of authority. Thirdly, we have not a word to say against the architectural genius of Pugin; but we affirm that the prejudices which both he and Ruskin have imported into high pictorial art are most lamentable. The former, in practice, reduces it to a conventional, affected, and distorted accessory of architecture; the latter to a pedantic puritanism. Again, we have not a word to say against decorative painting; only against those persons (and they are many) who think that in daubing their walls with patterns and painting their images they are patronising high art. When we call a pedantic reproduction "forgery," we do not impute any immorality to the reproducers; we only say that the art of making facsimiles is one shared with our artists by practitioners of a disreputable kind. And finally, to complain that art is reduced to a trade, to the execution of money-orders, without a thought about the real principles of beauty and congruity, is a very different thing from lamenting that the spirit of the age precludes the hope that the flow of funds will again give leisure and opportunity to the cultivators of true Christian art. As for architecture, for our own part, with Dr. Newman we admire the Gothic more than any other; and, now that Gothic architects have relinquished some of their absurd pretensions to set people right on points of liturgy and rubric, we think that it may be as well adapted to the modern developments of Catholic worship as any other architecture. What we have protested against, and ever will protest against, is, that abominable fanaticism which makes architecture a religious question, and which cannot treat with decent charity or peace those whose taste leads them to prefer a different style. How can we have peace or unity till each man is allowed liberty in doubtful things? We cannot bow our heads to the presumptuous pride of a didactic ignorance.—*Ed. R.*]

